Yemen.. Harvest of the year 2024.. The most important events: The escalation of the Red Sea crisis externally and the economic war internally

  The year (2024) opened its doors in Yemen with further escalation in external military hostilities, especially the naval confrontations imposed by the Houthi militias on international navigation since late 2023, and concluded with further escalation, confrontations and reactions between the occupying Israeli entity and the Houthi militias.

Although the year 2024 did not witness any major and influential military developments on the ground at the level of internal battles, the economic file in particular witnessed a remarkable escalation, more than ever, by the legitimate Yemeni government, through its central bank in Aden taking bold economic and financial decisions that aimed to weaken the joints of the economic and financial power of the Houthi group, and it almost succeeded in doing so had it not been for international and regional interventions.

In this file, we review the annual harvest of the year 2024, with the most important prominent and influential events and developments that Yemen witnessed during the past year (2024), and we will focus more on the two most important files that characterized the past year in terms of escalation in external battles (the maritime navigation crisis, and the air confrontations with Israel), and we will touch on some of the sub-events within their framework, and outside them (the most important internal files).

First: Military movements at the external level

1- Naval military escalation

The Houthi escalation in targeting ships in the Red and Arabian Seas, and obstructing international commercial maritime navigation, is considered the most important event that characterized the past year (2024), with its major escalation and resulting international and local repercussions, most notably the escalation of naval military confrontations between the Iranian Houthi militias and the international coalition forces led by the United States and Britain.

At the end of 2023, specifically in November, the Houthi militia launched its military attacks on ships in international navigation, in the Red and Arabian seas, claiming to target commercial ships heading to Israel due to its war against “Gaza” against the backdrop of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle (October 7, 2023).

Following this, on December 19, 2023 , the United States and the United Kingdom announced that they would lead an international coalition in a naval military operation called “Prosperity Guardian” to ensure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. With the beginning of the new year, confrontations and international reactions flared up, gradually escalating until the end of it.

In this space, we review a timeline of the most prominent military events and developments in the maritime navigation crisis, and their political and diplomatic repercussions.

• January 10, 2024 ; The Security Council adopted Resolution 2722, calling on the Houthis to immediately cease all attacks on commercial and transport vessels, and affirming “the right of Member States, in accordance with international law, to defend their vessels against attacks, including attacks that undermine navigational rights and freedoms.”
• January 12; Just two days after the UN Security Council resolution, US and British fighter jets began launching their first series of airstrikes against what were said to be Houthi military sites, in response to their attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea. This was met with the Houthi militia announcing that it would include US and British ships among its military targets, and expand its attacks on ships passing through the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, or any place its weapons could reach.
• February 16: The US administration headed by "Biden" re-lists the Houthis on the list of US "specially designated" terrorist entities.
• February 18: The Houthis target the British cargo ship "Robimar" with a ballistic missile near the Bab al-Mandab Strait in the Red Sea. The attack caused a massive oil spill in the Red Sea, as the ship was carrying approximately 22,000 metric tons of fertilizer (on March 2, 2024, the ship was reported to have sunk at sea. On March 8, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa (IGAD) confirmed that the Red Sea environment would need more than 30 years to recover from the severe consequences of the fuel and fertilizer spill that was on board the "Robimar").
• February 19: The European Union independently announced the launch of an operation called “Aspedes” to ensure the security and safety of maritime navigation in the “Red” and “Arab” seas.
• February 20: The Houthis announce that they have targeted Israeli sites in Umm al-Rashrash, south of occupied Palestine, with a number of drones.
• March 4: The Houthis announce targeting the Israeli ship "MSC Sky" in the Arabian Sea with a number of naval missiles. The British maritime security company "Ambry" confirms that the targeted ship, which was flying the "Liberian" flag, was damaged and sent a distress call.
• March 6: The Houthis announce targeting the American ship "True Confidence" with an anti-ship missile in the Gulf of Aden. The US Central Command confirms that the ship's crew reported the deaths of three people and the injury of four others, and the ship suffered significant damage as a result of the attack.
• March 18: The Israeli army announces the fall of a suspected air target north of the city of Eilat, originating from the Red Sea area, confirming that it fell in an open area. The UN Security Council renews its demand that the Houthi movement stop all attacks on ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, and stresses the need to prevent the expansion of the conflict in the Middle East.
• April 19: The G7 foreign ministers issued a statement expressing their countries’ concern over the situation in Yemen, strongly condemning the naval attacks carried out by the Houthi militias, and calling on them to engage in good faith in a comprehensive political process in Yemen, while warning Iran of further sanctions for its continued support of them with weapons.
• May 2: Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi announces that the group will begin implementing a “fourth phase” of escalation, targeting any ship owned by a company that uses Israeli ports, not just ships bound for Israel as in the past. He also threatens to expand attacks to include the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean.
• May 23: The group announced its first operation in the Mediterranean, targeting the Israeli ship Essex with a number of missiles.
• May 27: Announcement of the implementation of the first two operations in the Indian Ocean, the first targeting the Israeli-owned ship "MSC Mitchell", and the second targeting the Liberian-flagged ship "Minerva Lisa".
• July 24: For the first time, China has called on all parties to stop attacks on cargo ships in the Red Sea and to protect and secure international shipping lanes, pointing to the need to stop the conflict in the Gaza Strip, which will reduce the escalation in the Red Sea. (This came through press statements by its Chargé d'Affaires to Yemen, "Zhao Xing").

Throughout the rest of 2024, until the end, the Houthis continued their naval attacks, albeit to a lesser extent than in the first half, against commercial ships and international naval vessels, with a limited number of strikes directed against Israel (they escalated further in the last month of this year). In contrast, the international coalition forces led by the United States and Britain continued their air and naval attacks on a number of Houthi targets, while continuing to intercept Houthi attacks against their ships and naval vessels.

However, it is clear that these mutual attacks throughout the year did not weaken the capabilities of the Houthi militias, which appeared by the end of the year to be more powerful and focused in their attacks on ships. Nor did they witness many casualties on either side - except that the Houthi attacks did affect maritime navigation. A report issued by the World Bank on Yemen (summer 2024) confirmed that "the volume of traffic through the strategic Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandab Strait - which carry 30% of the world's container shipping - decreased by more than 60% by July 2024" - that is, during the first half of the year alone.

Various statistics

There are some published statistics and figures covering the Houthi naval attacks throughout the entire year, which we will review along with others covering only the first half of the year, as follows: -

• In the latest report of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, issued on December 16, 2024, 86 Houthi attacks on ships at sea were monitored during the period from January to November 2024. The infographic below details these attacks and their numbers according to the month.

• In statements by the US administration, it said that “From November 2023 through the end of April 2024, the Houthis carried out 50 attacks on ships, seizing one ship and sinking another.” - US Maritime Administration:

For more read:

CIA Director: US Strikes Against Houthis Not Enough to Deter Future Red Sea Attacks

• While the War Zone website published a statement by the US Navy (in May 2024) that there were “more than 110 attacks launched by Houthi militias on ships during the six-month period” (November 2023 – April 2024).

For more read:

US Navy: USS Destroyer Destroyed 65 Houthi Targets in 6 Months in Red Sea

• Report of the Panel of Experts of the Security Council on Yemen (2024)
  • “At least 134 attacks were carried out from Houthi-controlled areas on US and UK-flagged transport or commercial vessels and warships in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden between 15 November 2023 and 31 July 2024”;
  • “Among the commercial vessels targeted in the attacks were 31 tankers carrying oil, gas, liquefied petroleum gas or chemicals. Seven of the vessels were hit but were able to continue sailing. The attacks resulted in the deaths of at least four seafarers.”
  • “The US-UK coalition has intercepted or destroyed more than 800 missiles, drones, unmanned surface vessels, unmanned submersible vehicles, and surface-to-air missiles.”
  • The UN team's report confirmed that "the world has not witnessed such a scale of attacks on civilian ships using weapons systems since World War II."
  • The Houthis relied primarily on drones in their naval attacks, followed by sea missiles, and to a lesser extent guided boats.

Houthi numbers

• As for the Houthi militias, they claimed, on December 19 (last), that they had targeted 211 ships from November 2023 until the end of 2024.
• Meanwhile, the leader of the militias, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, appeared in his weekly speech on January 2, 2025, to present statistics specific to his group, in which he claimed that the American and British raids during the past year amounted to 931 raids and naval shelling , resulting in the killing of 106 Yemenis and the wounding of 314 .

2- Escalation of mutual attacks with Israel

With its involvement in threatening international maritime navigation, since November 19, 2023, the Houthi militias have also tried to target the Israeli depth with air strikes, missiles and drones, but they did not succeed much in achieving real, effective breakthroughs, until mid-2024, when they actually began to do so, which prompted Israeli reactions that affected vital interests under the control of the Houthis in the coastal province of Hodeidah (western Yemen).

Timeline of the escalation of confrontations between the Houthis and the Israelis..

• July 19, 2024: A Houthi drone managed to penetrate the airspace of the Israeli capital, Tel Aviv, killing one civilian and wounding 10 others.
• July 20: The day after the Houthi attack, Israel decided to respond by carrying out its first air strike on Yemen, targeting the port of Hodeidah.
• September 15: The Houthis launch another attack on Tel Aviv, without causing any damage or injuries.
• Late September: The Israeli Air Force carries out its second attack on Yemen, with a series of simultaneous attacks targeting the ports of Hodeidah, Ras Issa, and the power station in Ras Katheeb, leaving four dead and 40 wounded.
• December 19: A Houthi air attack targets the Israeli capital (Tel Aviv), succeeding in penetrating the missile dome. On the same day, Israel responds. With a series of airstrikes on the Houthis, it resumed bombing the ports of Hodeidah and Ras Issa for the third time. In addition, it targeted targets in the capital Sanaa for the first time, leaving nine dead and three injured, according to Houthi media.
• The period witnessed: 7 - 21 December,A remarkable intensification of Houthi air attacks Against Israel, this was considered an attempt by it to restore the structure of the Iranian resistance axis, which had fallen successively, the last of which was the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria on December 8.
• December 21: The Houthis launched another air attack on Tel Aviv with a hypersonic ballistic missile, wounding 30 civilians according to Israeli media.
• December 26: Israel responded with a series of airstrikes targeting the ports of Hodeidah and Ras Issa, as well as Sana'a International Airport, the Haiz power station in the capital, and the Ras Katheeb power station in Hodeidah. Six people were killed and dozens wounded.

3- International sanctions

Since the beginning of 2024, the US Treasury has issued a series of sanctions targeting Iranian individuals, financial institutions, shipping companies and ships that provide support to the Houthis, which it says passes through a wide network led by the Houthi leader known as "Saeed Al-Jamal". US sanctions also affected Houthi individuals, financial institutions and companies, after it re-listed the Houthi militia on the terrorism list on January 17, 2024, and the classification came into effect on February 16 of the same year.

In addition to Washington, a number of European and international countries also responded, for the first time, by imposing sanctions against the Houthis for targeting international navigation. These sanctions came according to the following timeline: -

• early januaryThe US Treasury Department announced the imposition of sanctions on 12 entities and individuals for their role in "arms trafficking, money laundering, and the illicit shipment of Iranian oil to the Houthis," including the head of the Houthi-affiliated Central Bank branch in Sana'a, Hashem Ismail al-Madani, whom the department considered "the main supervisor of funds sent to the Houthis from the Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. Alongside him is also Ahmed Mohammed Hassan al-Hadi, a senior financial official who coordinates and facilitates the transfer of Houthi funds on behalf of his group."

Second: The internal front

1- Confrontations and military movements

At the level of internal battles and confrontations, the past year (2024) did not witness many military events and movements. This is mainly due to the continuation of the "fragile" truce for the third year in a row, announced in April 2022 through the mediation of UN envoy "Hans Grundberg" for a period of six months, which continued after its end, albeit unofficially.

With the exception of some Houthi movements and violations on a number of fronts, including the governorates of Taiz, Hodeidah, Lahj, Al Dhale, Hajjah, Shabwa, Marib and Saada. As a result of these violations, "the Yemeni government lost 329 soldiers and 883 others were injured during the first half of 2024" - according to what was confirmed by the International Panel of Experts on Yemen in its report (2024), citing private sources.

• April-September: Lahj and Al Dhale governorates witnessed a major escalation by the Houthis, who attempted to advance and seize areas under government control on several fronts, but this did not result in any progress for the Houthis.
• Throughout the world, Taiz Governorate witnessed several small, scattered battles, including Houthi infiltration attempts that were all thwarted. The city witnessed repeated Houthi shelling of residential neighborhoods, the most prominent and dangerous of which was the targeting of a popular market in the village of "Bumiyah" in the Maqbanah district in the western countryside of Taiz (December 1), which resulted in the killing of six civilians and the injury of eight others. This was followed by another crime in the last third of the same month when a house in the same village was shelled, killing a child and injuring three others.
• By the end of the year, the Houthi militia intensified its attacks and movements on the battlefronts and contact lines, especially on the fronts of Hodeidah and Taiz, in light of an escalation in its naval operations and the implementation of military maneuvers in which it simulated what it called urban warfare, in preparation for confronting any ground operations that the group claims the Americans and the West are planning, amid fears among the militias of the participation of those affiliated with the government in those operations.

2- Humanitarian violations

The Yemeni arena also witnessed a number of violations of a humanitarian nature, committed by the Houthi militias, the most prominent of which are:

• March 19: The horrific massacre committed by Houthi militias in the city of Rada’a in Al Bayda Governorate, after blowing up homes over the heads of their residents, killing about 15 people, including women and children. The incident sparked widespread popular anger among the people of the governorate and its tribes, and throughout the country.
• September: Houthi militias suppressed citizens celebrating the 62nd anniversary of the September 26 Revolution in areas under their control, using excessive violence, threats, and arrests.

For more.. read:

• • Despite the militia's threats and suppression, Yemenis celebrate the September 26 Revolution by lighting its torch and launching fireworks
  • How did the September 21 anniversary turn into a fierce battle against the Houthis?

• November ; Houthi militias force residents of five villages south of Al-Jarahi district, comprising 350 families, or about 1,750 people, to evacuate their homes at gunpoint, to begin construction, digging tunnels, and building military fortifications in those residential areas. According to a statement by the local authority in Hodeidah, which confirmed that this operation "came days after similar displacement operations that affected hundreds of residents of the coastal city of Al-Manzar, located on the outskirts of Hodeidah city and affiliated with Al-Hawak district, where the terrorist Houthi militias built a wall around the city, which has a population of approximately 4,500 people, and closed all outlets and roads leading to it, forcing its residents to flee."
• Earlier in the same year, the Houthi militia had displaced the residents of the village of Al-Daqawneh, located on the main road linking Haradh and Al-Hodeidah, affiliated with Bajil District, with a population of 70 families, and turned the Al-Khobah fish port in Al-Luhayyah District into a closed military zone after preventing fishermen from anchoring their boats and practicing their fishing activities.

3- Restricting organizations

Over the past years, the Houthi militia has tightened the noose on local and international humanitarian organizations, imposed financial sums on them, and worked to control relief operations and their distribution to beneficiaries, which complicated relief operations and forced several institutions to transfer their projects to the liberated governorates. Recently, it kidnapped dozens of employees working in UN, international and local organizations.

• On May 31, the Houthi militias carried out a kidnapping campaign that targeted dozens of employees working in relief and humanitarian organizations affiliated with the United Nations and civil society, fabricating charges against them of working for America and Israel. These charges are used by the militia to legitimize the kidnapping of opponents in the areas it controls by force of arms.
• In July:The Houthi militia has imposed new conditions on international organizations operating in areas under its control, requiring organizations to consult with the militias to obtain approval to “employ local or foreign (new) cadres according to their needs and activities.” A memorandum issued by the so-called “Supreme Council for the Management and Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs” (SCMCHA) demanded that organizations “quickly provide them with the functional structure of each organization, specifying the job title and name of the employee, and to adhere to obtaining prior approval from the council before completing the procedures for employing any local or foreign cadres...,” a step that observers considered to be an attempt by the militias to employ and replace their members in relief organizations instead of those who were kidnapped and against whom malicious charges were fabricated.

 Economic file

The economic file in Yemen witnessed, during the past year 2024, a major escalation by the internationally recognized government against the terrorist Houthi militia, which reached its peak in May and June of the year, while the national currency continued to collapse against foreign currencies amid the increasing deterioration of living conditions.

The most prominent economic issue witnessed during the past year were the decisions of the Central Bank in Aden, with the aim of addressing the crisis of economic division imposed by the militias since 2016. These decisions stipulated the suspension of dealing with six banks, followed by measures leading to the cessation of these banks’ access to correspondent banks and the “SWIFT” system. In addition to the cancellation of licenses and the ban on dealing with dozens of exchange companies and prepaid payment services, which was met with Houthi decisions to stop dealing with 13 banks in areas controlled by the government.

The Central Bank's decisions received wide popular support. It was said at the time that they aimed to address the situation of the banking sector and monetary policy, combat money laundering and terrorist financing, and confront the Houthi militia's attempts to undermine the banking sector and exploit it to enable it to control the national financial and economic capabilities to implement its agendas. However, after the Houthi militia threatened Saudi Arabia and accused it of being behind these decisions, UN envoy Grundberg rushed to express his concern about these measures, calling for postponing them at least until the end of August 2024. On July 23, he announced an agreement between the legitimate government and the Houthis to address some humanitarian and economic issues, including "cancelling the Central Bank's decisions" and halting any similar decisions or measures in the future, resuming Yemenia flights between Sana'a and Jordan and increasing the number of flights to three daily, and operating daily flights, or as needed, to Cairo and India.

The UN envoy's announcement was met with widespread public disapproval, and was said to have come as a result of Saudi pressure on the Presidential Leadership Council. This prompted the Central Bank Governor Ahmed Ghaleb Al-Ma'baqi and his deputy Mansour Rajih to submit their resignations, which were rejected by the Presidential Council.

This comes at a time when the Yemeni government has been suffering huge losses in its main revenues due to the halt in oil exports since the export ports in Hadhramaut and Shabwa were bombed by Houthi militias in October and November 2022. According to the governor of the Central Bank, the losses incurred by the government amounted to $6 billion annually.

For more details, see the infographic below with the most important economic events during the year 2024 according to their chronological order.

During different periods of the year 2024, the Yemeni riyal continued to collapse rapidly against foreign currencies in the liberated areas, especially during the last quarter of the year, to begin with the new year 2025, with an exchange rate exceeding 2,050 riyals per dollar, and the Saudi riyal between 541 and 543 Yemeni riyals. Despite the announcement of a Saudi deposit, at the beginning of the new year (2025), the Yemeni riyal did not witness any improvement.

Yemenia Airlines Crisis

In mid-2024, a severe crisis erupted between the government and the Houthi militia over the militia's control of Yemenia Airlines' revenues and its refusal to hand them over to the beneficiaries as usual, estimated at $100 million, which prompted the government to take a decision to transfer the company's accounts outside the control of the Houthis, who then seized 4 aircraft from the Yemenia fleet. Yemenia Airlines is a 51-49 percent Yemeni-Saudi company, and the Houthis see it as spoils of war and have recently begun taking over.

Events and actions taken during the year 2024, according to their chronological sequence: -

• June 5: Minister of Transport Abdul Salam Hamid directed that the revenues of Yemenia Airlines be transferred to its bank accounts in the interim capital Aden, or its bank accounts abroad, starting from the beginning of June 2024; to keep it away from the control of the Houthi militias. On the same day, Yemenia Airlines denied what it described as “allegations” promoted by the Houthi militia regarding the suspension of the flight line (Sanaa-Amman-Sanaa).
• June 24: Houthi militias banned the sale of flight tickets from Sana’a airport, or reservations from offices outside Yemen, and warned that “no violating tickets will be dealt with starting today.”
• June 25: Minister of Endowments and Guidance in the legitimate government, "Mohammed Shabiba", announces that the Houthi militia has detained four Yemenia Airlines planes, three of which were coming from the Kingdom, and one was detained in October 2023.
• June 26: Yemenia Airlines confirms that the Houthi militias detained four Yemenia planes at Sana’a Airport (Airbus 320), three of which were seized upon their arrival from King Abdulaziz Airport in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, a direct bridge between Jeddah and Sana’a that the company had inaugurated on June 20.
• June 28: The Presidential Leadership Council decides to form a government committee headed by the Prime Minister to manage the crisis of hijacking planes at Sana’a Airport.
• July 3: Yemeni Deputy Minister of Transport Nasser Sharif reveals that the Houthi militia’s hijacking of Yemenia Airlines planes has caused huge losses, amounting to 6 billion Yemeni riyals per month.
• July 17: Yemenia Airways signs an agreement with Airbus in Dubai, UAE, to purchase 8 A320 and A321 aircraft, in the largest deal to enhance the Yemenia fleet after the Houthis seized its four aircraft. The agreement will continue for 6 years from the start of Yemenia Airways’ financial payments starting in 2028, and the schedule for receiving the 8 aircraft will start from 2031 until 2034, at a rate of two aircraft each year.

Telecommunications sector

Since its coup against the legitimate authority in the country (2015), the Houthi militias have imposed their control over the entire telecommunications sector (governmental and private), including the only internet network in the country, "YemenNet". Over the past years, the internationally recognized government has not taken any real and comprehensive steps or procedures to seize control of this vital sector, which generates large financial returns for the militias, in addition to its control and monitoring of communications and the internet, which puts everyone at its mercy. The United Nations team of experts indicated in its annual reports that the Houthis receive approximately two billion dollars annually from this sector.

According to a report by the Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Yemen is witnessing an increasing spread of communication methods, as the total number of mobile phone subscribers reached about 17.7 million subscribers, distributed among all companies providing this service. The number of Internet subscribers also reached more than 402 thousand subscribers by the end of 2021, while the total number of mobile Internet subscribers approached ten million subscribers.

There are four mobile phone companies operating in Yemen, three of which were private, in addition to the government-owned Yemen Mobile, which is controlled by the Houthis and includes the majority of mobile phone subscribers in the country, currently estimated at more than 20 million.

In early August, the government announced the launch of the Starlink satellite internet service in Yemen.

Notable miscellaneous events in 2024:

• • January 4: The Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council, Rashad Al-Alimi, issued two decisions to establish two security agencies, the first called the Central Agency for State Security and the other, called the Counter-Terrorism Agency, with their headquarters in the interim capital, Aden.
  • February 5: Former Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik was dismissed and Ahmed Awad bin Mubarak was appointed as his successor.
  • March 18: Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed bin Mubarak says the roadmap for a political solution in Yemen, announced by the UN envoy in December 2023, has stalled due to Houthi escalation in the Red Sea and attacks on international shipping. (During a virtual meeting held by bin Mubarak with Yemeni ambassadors abroad/Saba Agency)
  • March 26: The Chairman of the Yemeni Presidential Leadership Council issues a presidential decree appointing Shaya Mohsen Al-Zindani as Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriate Affairs.
  • May 23: Japan's Mari Yamashita is appointed Deputy Head of the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement ( UNMHA ), succeeding Dutchwoman Viviane van der Per.
  • Early June: A Houthi delegation headed to Saudi Arabia, led by Yahya Abdullah Al-Razami, at Riyadh’s invitation to perform the Hajj rituals.
  • June 30: New negotiations between the Yemeni government and the Houthi militias over prisoners and abductees have begun in the Omani capital, Muscat, under the auspices of the Office of the UN Envoy to Yemen and the International Committee of the Red Cross. This round of negotiations is the first to be hosted publicly by Muscat since the outbreak of the war in Yemen, but it has not produced any positive results.
  • July 9: The UN Security Council extends the mandate of the United Nations Mission to support the Hodeidah Agreement (UNMHA) for an additional year (until July 14, 2025)
  • August 1: The Security Council Sanctions Committee decides to lift sanctions on the late Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son Ahmed Ali, which were imposed on them for nearly a decade, along with senior Houthi officials.
  • August 12: The Houthi militia forms a new government under the name of the “Government of Change and Construction,” headed by “Ahmed Al-Rahwi,” consisting of 19 ministerial portfolios, about a year after the dismissal of the previous government headed by Abdul Aziz bin Habtoor, which continued to operate throughout the year as a caretaker government.
  • August 22: Forces from the Homeland Shield, formed by decision of the President of the Presidential Leadership Council, take over the Al-Wadiah land port linking Yemen and Saudi Arabia in Hadramaut Governorate, east of the country. They took over from the 141st Brigade, one of the most important brigades of the Yemeni army that contributed to the liberation of parts of Marib Governorate, reaching the Nihm District east of Sana’a in 2015 and 2016, while the First Battalion of the brigade was responsible for the port.
  • August 27: Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council, Dr. Rashad Al-Alimi, makes his first visit to Taiz Governorate since assuming office in April 2022, accompanied by a number of council members and government officials, in a visit that is the first by a Yemeni president to the city in more than 15 years.
  • August 27: The Houthi militia announced the appointment of a new Iranian ambassador, named "Ali Muhammad Ramadhani", to succeed the former ambassador "Hassan Irloo", who died in mysterious circumstances on December 19, 2021 after being transported humanely on an Omani plane from Sanaa to Muscat, and it was said that he later died from his infection with the Corona virus.
  • October 7: The US Treasury Department places prominent Yemeni businessman and member of the Yemeni parliament, Sheikh Hamid Abdullah al-Ahmar, and three others, along with a number of companies that al-Ahmar runs in several countries, on the US sanctions list on charges of running a network to finance the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas).
  • October 8: Two Saudi officers were killed by a soldier inside the Joint Forces Command in the First Military Region in Hadhramaut Governorate, and the killer fled.
  • October 14: The Homeland Shield Forces begin securing the international road (Al-Abr - Shabwa), after receiving all camps, observation and inspection points from the command of the First Military Region Forces of the Yemeni army.
  • October 16: Washington calls on the United Nations to take steps to strengthen the UN “inspection and verification mechanism” for the entry of goods and merchandise into the port of Hodeidah in western Yemen. The US Deputy Representative to the United Nations confirms that it is “critical to stopping the flow of weapons to the Houthis.”
  • October 19: Security authorities in Al Mahrah Governorate announced the seizure of 3,975 spare parts for Kalashnikov weapons at the Shahn customs on the border with the Sultanate of Oman.
  • November 5: Announcement of the formation of the “National Bloc of Political Parties and Components” in Aden, which includes 22 political parties and groups, and the selection of the head of the Shura Council and leader of the General People’s Congress Party, “Ahmed bin Dagher,” as its rotating president.
  • November 14: The UN Security Council votes unanimously on a draft resolution to renew the sanctions regime and extend the mandate of the Panel of Experts on Yemen for one year.
  • November 21: The Swedish government decides to halt its development aid to Yemen due to the continued detention of UN staff by the Houthis.