After the practical division... what is the prospect of separation in Yemen?

In fact, Yemen is witnessing an unmistakable state of division, where for ten years there are two authorities that are distinct in their political color, identity, and administrative form, although corruption unites them, with a difference in the degree of use of violence, oppression, and the rule of law, and a discriminatory political practice in which the Houthi group wins first place. There are two monetary policies, one issued from Aden and the other from Sana’a, resulting in a Yemeni riyal with two different prices. There are two educational systems, so what is the horizon of separation?

The Houthis are a separatist group. They are the first to establish division through various means, despite the precedence of the claim of secession by a faction in the south. However, the Houthi group is a separatist group that controls northwestern Yemen, not because it has been convinced about the south or because it actually sees the southern issue as a fundamental issue in addressing the Yemeni issue and that there is no harm in making concessions, but rather secession is a way to consolidate and consolidate its authority in a part of Yemen so that it can later generalize its coercive authority and impose its political-religious identity and sectarian hegemony over the rest of Yemen.

Here are the facts:

First, the military preparations by the various components of legitimacy are defensive preparations only and do not aim to reach Sana'a, while the Houthis are accumulating military capabilities and enhancing their combat capabilities, especially missiles, in an offensive manner that enables them to seize the entire country.

Secondly, the legitimate government has not been able to carry out any regional action that resulted in any direct harm to Sana’a or Hodeidah since the flights stopped, while the Houthi harm has crossed the combat lines and created new rules of engagement, striking facilities in Aden, Hadramout and Shabwa, which are far from the confrontation fronts.

Third, for many reasons, including the oscillation between expressing itself as a temporary Yemeni capital or remaining under the control of a separatist faction, Aden was unable to transform into a capital for all Yemenis and a military, security, political, partisan and diplomatic base for waging the battle to restore the state and defeat the Houthi threat, while Sana’a plays a central role in the Houthi strategy to seize all of Yemen.

This does not mean that the Houthi group is unitary in its formation or approach, but rather expansionist, gradually and in stages, and is waiting for the opportunity to extend its influence over the entire south and east. It has previously tried to do so, when it seized Aden, Lahj, and cities in Shabwa and Abyan with its hordes, and its hand was not limited to anything other than regional military action or with significant regional support.

Therefore, based on the desire to swallow the country and impose sectarian and political unity, this Houthi group cannot be a unity partner with the rest of the political forces that do not favor federalism or desire a unified Yemen and have a rigid position against any separatist tendency, whether political or military. Likewise, the group’s current divisive behavior cannot be relied upon to achieve a complete separation in the south.

The southern separatist elites would be naive if they were to take comfort in this temporary Houthi position and think that they could withdraw and not engage in a single battle to undermine Houthi authority. They would be even more naive if they thought that the Houthis were a suitable party to achieve secession because they curb the unionist forces in the north and would accept sharing the country with them.

On the other hand, the flabbiness and even disintegration of the Yemeni state from within the legitimacy does not mean that the entire south has reached a political consensus on determining the political identity and form of the southern and eastern regions, with which the secession of the south becomes a foregone conclusion and a procedural matter.

The past ten years have created a new reality in the southern and eastern regions that has made the secession of the south more complicated than it was during the national dialogue phase. Because it has transformed this matter from a political issue that relies on the grievances of the south during the Saleh era and the mismanagement of the integration phase as an issue that enjoys political acceptance for discussion to an arena for local-regional conflict that threatens the safety of the south itself.

As many regional powers clashed, the establishment of a unified southern political identity and entity became extremely complex and a path that does not lead back to arduous conflicts due to the multiplicity of actors, the diversity of their external dependencies, and the proliferation of armed political entities. A state of political weakness and fragmentation emerged, making it impossible for one political project to triumph over others except through bloodshed, elimination, marginalization, and exclusion. That is, by repeating bad experiences that are not suitable for building a future.

Is it possible to address such a topic at this stage?

Preoccupation with the conflict with the Houthis, the desire to appease the southern situation, rising above the extremism mood, preferring to create a climate of solidarity, directing attention towards greater and urgent dangers, and re-arranging priorities implicitly calls for not addressing the situation in the south with a kind of frankness and transparency. However, research integrity or genuine interest in the Yemeni situation requires delving into it and requires placing the index finger where it should be pointed out, pointing out the shortcomings, inadequacies, and defects.

The bottom line here is that the fragmentation situation that the Houthis are rushing to draw in Yemen does not lead to a safe separation, nor does it provide its true conditions, no matter how much the phenomena of fragmentation appear in their superficial dimension to be a foundation for separation.

The southern separatist elites will be mistaken if they rely on this temporary partition reality drawn up by the Houthi will, which may surprise them with its fluctuations. The non-separatist elites will also be mistaken if they do not gather their latent forces to overcome the partition, given its high cost to the Yemeni present.

(From the author's page)