Signs of a multi-party war in Yemen with a dangerous political horizon

These days, the pace of military parades is escalating, taking on the character of mutual moral deterrence, amid expectations that things could get out of hand, leading to the outbreak of war again; especially on the traditional confrontation fronts in the center and west of the country, after years of discipline dictated by the international will and the blatant disregard by regional powers for the Yemeni coalition partners represented by the legitimacy camp with its authority, parties, and military forces.

Marib Governorate represents one of the main arenas for testing the military capabilities of government forces and the Houthis, through intermittent and violent clashes witnessed in the areas south and north of the governorate, and on the outskirts of Al-Jawf Governorate. Marib itself was also the scene of a show of force in its tribal form this time, in a trend that Saudi Arabia apparently prefers for a potential battle with the Houthis, awaiting the maturity of regional and international conditions that may allow it to erupt on the Yemeni scene, at low costs, similar to what happened in Syria in November 2024.

Showing the tribal dimension in the military parade implies a clear desire to neutralize the traditional political tools on which the change process, its commitments and its political horizon were based, and to ensure that the political results of the potential battle with the Houthis will be a complete annihilation of the political environment and democratic pluralism in Yemen, which implies a premeditated intention to keep the yeast of conflict in Yemen.

There is a real will on the part of both sides of the war to achieve the goals of military resolution and end the exceptional and difficult situation that the Yemenis are experiencing. However, the current balance of power has made them lose the ability to control the course of the war, in contrast to the clear dominance enjoyed by regional and international powers, which does not stop at controlling the resources of money, weapons and decision-making, but also at controlling the securing of future political and geopolitical shares for the parties to the war.

The Houthi group, which appears to the world to be largely independent in its military options, as demonstrated by the confrontations in the southern Red Sea, does not have the luxury of going immediately or testing its ability to resolve the military situation with the other parties to the war. This is due to the fact that its qualitative military capabilities do not constitute a deterrent factor for local forces at all, as there are no sensitive targets that can be reached to reduce the difference in power and the time of the confrontation and push the other party to surrender.

The most sensitive facilities are the oil and gas facilities, which are currently disabled and do not represent a war advantage for the legitimate government under whose control they are located, in light of the cessation of oil and gas exports, which is reflected in the budget and the severe fragility of the economy and the currency circulating in the legitimate areas.

I am certain that the Houthis do not want to test the forces of legitimacy, despite their division, because if that happens, it will be a reason to secure the required level of consensus within the legitimacy camp, which is divided by regional intervention, and which will be forced to provide the military supplies necessary to engage in a confrontation; either to keep the balance at its current levels or it may push towards reducing the influence of the Houthis and perhaps defeating them, and both are achievable.

The Houthis realize the danger of the shift in the American geopolitical position towards the conflict in Yemen, from clear support for the Houthis to targeting them, and to the relentless pursuit to disable their military power, which began with the precise targeting of selected targets from fortified weapons depots and operations centers, and the intensification of military air surveillance and the relentless pursuit of finding more effective alternatives to fight a decisive multi-party battle against them, which may not be surprising to the Houthis who found themselves, due to American pressure on Riyadh, negotiating with the Saudi government, and planning with its ambassador and his team the future of ruling Yemen without any significant presence of the internationally recognized legitimate authority and its forces and men.

The role played by European countries, which contributed to stereotyping the battle, establishing its humanitarian dimension, and directly and indirectly collaborating with the Houthi group, has diminished in its effects due to the shift in the American position, which will undoubtedly narrow the scope of this chaos, which Western organizations contributed to feeding, before it was recently revealed that they were relying in a large part of their activity on American support, which was stopped by the Trump administration.

The most dangerous aspect of the potential battle with the Houthis is the multi-dimensional neutralization and disruption of the legitimate authority and its forces, in addition to the ambiguity of the political path, which has clearly lacked the required level of commitment to the references governing the Yemeni crisis. These fears stem from the behavior of regional powers, who anticipated the expected decisive moment by restricting the Yemeni scene with a package of absurd agreements and understandings that strengthened the authority of the Houthis and strengthened the influence of the armed cantons, some of which represent a clear targeting of Yemen’s unity and territorial integrity.

(Arabic 21)