US Center: Rapprochement between Russia and the Houthis constitutes a deviation from the initial neutrality adopted by Moscow in the Yemen war

As Russia’s ties with Iran have expanded over the past few years, Moscow has become increasingly tied to the “Axis of Resistance,” a sprawling network of militias backed by the Islamic Republic across the Middle East, according to the Stimpson Center.

The American center said in a report translated by "Yemeni Youth Net" that examples of this include the growing cooperation between Russia and the Houthis, as Russia has hosted several Houthi delegations since last October, provided diplomatic cover for the group at the United Nations, and is said to have provided tracking data to the Houthis to allow them to better target commercial shipping in the Red Sea.

Russia is also reportedly planning to supply the Yemeni militia with weapons such as AK-74 rifles and Yakhont anti-ship missiles. Furthermore, there have been reports of military advisers from Russia’s GRU military intelligence agency being present in Houthi-controlled territory.

At the political level, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov held several meetings with Houthi representatives. The Houthis responded by emphasizing the declaration of “independence” of the Russian-occupied Ukrainian regions of Donetsk and Luhansk on February 21, 2022—a declaration that was made before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

In addition, there have been recent allegations that the Houthis were being pushed to fight in Ukraine as part of a smuggling operation that lured Yemeni fighters with promises of well-paying jobs and Russian citizenship.

The report added that the rapprochement between Russia and the Houthis constitutes a departure from Moscow’s initial neutrality in the civil war in Yemen that erupted in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Russia still technically recognizes the internationally accepted Yemeni government, based in the southern city of Aden.

But this hedging approach has given way to more active engagement with the Houthis as Moscow sees new opportunities in the Arabian Peninsula to compete with the West and divert attention from Ukraine. The Kremlin is signaling that it has geographic reach to hurt the West and punish it for opposing Russia’s regional ambitions in Ukraine.

Beyond the anti-Western dimension, Moscow appears to have intervened in Yemen as a means of gaining leverage over Saudi Arabia amid its negotiations with the United States over a possible defense treaty. This thinking is particularly relevant in the prospects of a second Trump administration, in which Riyadh may choose a more pro-American stance on managing oil prices. In return, Trump may seek to limit Saudi Arabia’s growing ties with Russia.

But Moscow is aware of the potential downsides of increased cooperation with non-state actors like the Houthis. Russia does not want to alienate Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were engaged in a bloody conflict with the Houthis in Yemen from 2016 to 2022.

Moscow has grown increasingly close to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine. The two Arab states, in turn, see Russia’s shift away from the European Union and toward Asia and the Middle East as highly beneficial to their strategic vision of foreign policy diversification.

Given the transactional nature of Russia’s Middle East policy, its leadership is unlikely to risk expanding its ties with the wealthy Gulf states. This may explain why Moscow has so far sent only a small batch of weapons to the Houthis.

At the same time, if Russia sees the Houthi militia as a valuable asset as a tool to disrupt Western influence in the Middle East and, more importantly, divert Western military aid from Ukraine, some in the Kremlin may calculate that it is worth antagonizing Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Russia may also supply the Houthis with weapons indirectly through Iran or seek guarantees from them that they will not use Russian weapons against their Arab neighbors.

Nor is Russia prepared to completely downgrade its relations with Israel. Moscow and Tel Aviv have long enjoyed a special, if non-alliance, relationship that has allowed Israel a free hand in attacking Iranian and Hezbollah targets in Syria. In contrast, Israel has been silent on the war in Ukraine.

Overall, Russia’s position in the Middle East is opportunistic. While Russia avoids deep military involvement, it facilitates the Houthis’ efforts to play a role in the region’s pivotal conflict and advances Russia’s regional ambitions.