The wide edge of war and Netanyahu's trap

Benjamin Netanyahu fears the end of the war. There will be investigation committees and many questions about responsibilities and failures. For him, it is almost a story of life and death. But the issue cannot be reduced to Netanyahu clinging to his office to hide from accountability. It is true that the Prime Minister's signature is a must in any assassination of a first-ranking enemy that could have security and political repercussions, but it is also true that the military and security establishment is the one that puts the list of options on the Prime Minister's table for him to choose between.

Most likely, the recent assassinations in Beirut and Tehran expressed the desire of the Israeli security establishment to restore the deterrence capacity that was deeply shaken after the launch of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation. The battle of image has always been important for Israel. She believes that enemies' feeling of the high cost that could result from their attacks might prompt them to abandon their implementation.

Timing in wars is of exceptional importance. The two assassinations came after Netanyahu stood for the fourth time before Congress, which applauded him for a long time despite the absences that can only be noted without overestimating their effects. In that speech, Iran was mentioned 27 times, and the talk of a ceasefire was absent.

There are those who believe that Netanyahu concluded from his trip that the United States cannot resign from defending Israel, despite Joe Biden’s reproach and Kamala Harris’ remarks. They believe that Netanyahu waited to complete the exhaustion of Hamas in Gaza before paying attention to what he saw as the danger coming from Beirut and Tehran. They say that the Israeli Prime Minister felt that Hezbollah was unwilling to engage in a wide-scale war, and that Tehran was also unwilling, and that is why he decided to invoke this war to embarrass both parties.

Netanyahu approved two strikes that left Iran and the party with no choice but to respond, and he followed them up by officially announcing the confirmation of the killing of Muhammad al-Deif, the most senior general of the Qassam group and its brightest symbol. Perhaps he wanted all of this to give the next phase of the war the character of confrontation with Iran and its allies, not with the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

He wanted to open the file of Iran, its regional role, and its nuclear program, in order to obscure the file of the ceasefire in Gaza, the settlement, and the Palestinian state. He may have wanted to bring back the specter of an American-Iranian confrontation when America takes part in thwarting the Iranian attack on Israel, especially if Tehran’s allies take the initiative to attack military bases in the region.

There are those who believe that Netanyahu pushed the region to the brink of a wide-scale war to block the path to an open war of attrition, and to demand that Iran cease fire on all fronts without exception.

The Israeli military and security establishment knows that Hezbollah's missiles and drones are capable of reaching any point in Israel. The same is true of Iran's missiles and drones. Despite this, it chose to put both parties before the option of a wide war.

Hezbollah cannot not respond to the assassination of its chief military officer, Fouad Shukr, in its stronghold in the southern suburbs of Beirut, and Iran cannot not respond to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran.

The Israeli establishment is behaving as if it is trying to move the war from a confrontation with the program of Yahya Sinwar to a confrontation with the program of the Iranian leader. That is why Netanyahu was keen yesterday to say: “We are waging a multi-front war against Iran and its agents, and we will strongly strike every one of its arms.” Ten months later, Israel decided to deal with the “Al-Aqsa Flood” as if it were the beginning of a coordinated and open war of attrition, the stopping of which would be worth the risk of going to the brink of a comprehensive conflict with its sponsors.

Netanyahu's behavior in recent days explains his behavior in the past ten months. A ceasefire was not possible for him, even if it was accompanied by a phased release of the hostages. He believed that directing a fatal blow against Hamas and Gaza together was a strategic goal that far outweighed the importance of celebrating the return of the hostages. There are those who believe that they dream of inflicting losses on “Hezbollah” similar to those they inflicted on “Hamas,” despite the differences in the nature of the forces, the theater of confrontation, and the regional depth. This also explains why the Biden administration was unable to extract an Israeli position that would help pass the “deal.”

The Middle East lives in anticipation of a strike. There is increasing belief that it will be more severe than what the region witnessed last April, especially because of the assassinations that preceded it. Waiting comes with questions about the limits of the fire. What will be the role of the Iraqi factions loyal to Iran? What are the limits of the Houthis’ contribution? What is the role of the Syrian Front? Will Netanyahu respond to the Iranian strike by shifting the weight of the battle to the “Lebanese arena”?

For decades we have been hearing that the Middle East is living on a hot plate. The new scenes are unprecedented, and the summer of assassinations and exchanges of blows is more intense. Where are the limits of Israeli influence in the region? Where are the limits of the Iranian role? Can America accept what has changed to organize “rules of engagement” between Iran and Israel that keep the region away from the brink of widespread war?

It is the terrible Middle East; Governments are confused, armies are worried, factions are on alert, American bases are on alert, and battleships do not sleep... What are the most difficult days in this part of the world!

*Quoted from Asharq Al-Awsat