Yemen: The Intervenors and Ali Abdullah Saleh's Resurrection

On July 30, the Security Council Sanctions Committee, formed pursuant to Resolution 2140 of 2014, announced the removal of the name of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and his son, Brigadier General Ahmed Ali, from the sanctions list that includes the leader of the Houthi group and several military leaders affiliated with the group. The importance of the decision, which placed Yemen under Chapter VII and largely formulated the war equation, lies in dropping legal restrictions and forms of ban on President Saleh and his son Ahmed, which, in light of the agenda of the interveners, may mean a step towards returning the Saleh family to the political scene and also consecrating the General People's Congress Party.

For various reasons, the return of the former president’s family to power was the ideal choice for international and regional actors in Yemen. If the inclusion of Saleh and his son, Brigadier General Ahmed, in the UN sanctions list restricted Western powers, regional interveners resorted to alternative options, specifically the UAE. Although it continued to pin its hopes on Saleh’s son Ahmed (the former Yemeni ambassador to the UAE and resident in its territory) as an ideal candidate for power in Yemen, it adopted the support of Brigadier General Tariq Abdullah Saleh (Saleh’s nephew), and imposed him as a striking military force on the West Coast, in addition to reformulating the legitimate authority in agreement with Saudi Arabia, and forming the “Presidential Council,” which granted Brigadier General Tariq and the General People’s Congress (Saleh’s wing) political legitimacy. However, the UAE’s fears of a crisis over the legitimacy of Saleh’s succession in the future made it diversify its options, by promoting his younger son, Brigadier General Ammar, who has become a growing force in the last two years, even though he continues to operate in the shadows, in contrast to Tariq’s dominance of the military and political front.

In parallel, it continued its political efforts to lift international sanctions on Brigadier General Ahmed, Saleh’s eldest son, who remained the best option for the UAE and the legitimate heir to his father. If the international powers’ keenness to stabilize the status quo in Yemen hindered its efforts, the continued imbalance of power in favor of the Houthi group locally, as well as the escalation of its attacks on navigation in the Red Sea, and its transformation into an effective military force in the axis of Islamic resistance, finally prompted both the United States and Britain to remove Saleh and his son from the sanctions list, with the aim of lifting restrictions on his political activity, and thus improving the chances of the group’s opponents’ camp, while the UAE is betting on enabling Saleh’s son to play a political role in the future. Lifting the legal restrictions on Saleh’s conference also allows it, with its multiple agents in southern and northern Yemen, to consolidate its influence and interests. In addition, returning Saleh’s family to the political forefront means, in light of its interventions in Arab countries to restore the pre-“Arab Spring” regimes, the culmination of its strategy as an opposing force. For revolutions.

The relationship between the General People's Congress and Saleh's family has many aspects, extending from its founding by Saleh and his reliance on his weight as a former president in power, to the political and popular support of the party through Saleh's centrality in the Congress, and also his family later on, which led to the interconnectedness of their political fate and future. If Saleh's killing led to the fragmentation of the Congress into many branches, from the Sana'a Congress to the Congress in the areas subject to the Presidential Council, not to mention the divergence of their political agendas, the consequences of including Saleh and his son, Brigadier General Ahmed, on the UN sanctions list were reflected on the Congress Party in general, as well as on its branches, and on the forms of restrictions to which it is subject, politically, legally, and popularly. On the one hand, the continued presence of Saleh and his son on the sanctions list, alongside the leader of the Houthi group and its leaders, forcibly linked them to a political alliance, even if it was cracked in reality, and thus hindered the Sana'a Congress from separating from the group.

In contrast, the branches of the conference in the areas subject to the Presidential Council, although they have overcome the forms of restrictions resulting from the inclusion of Saleh and his son in the sanctions list, and returned to the political scene, their remaining on the sanctions list has continued to undermine the legitimacy of the conference as a force opposing the Houthi group’s project, and has greatly hindered its political activity and the expansion of its popularity, by holding Saleh and his son, along with the Houthi group, politically and militarily responsible for the fall of Sana’a and state institutions, and fueling the conflict in Yemen.

The ban on the activities of Saleh’s son also made the conference sectors, which attach importance to the traditions of inheritance and legitimacy in Saleh’s family, lose the ability to support Brigadier General Ahmed with political and popular weight that would enhance the conference’s balance, and perhaps unify its conflicting wings. Therefore, the disappearance of Saleh’s son in contrast to Tariq’s promotion did not improve the conference’s position or its acceptance of Tariq’s position and political and military role, from his lack of legitimacy to represent Saleh, to his contribution to fragmenting the official military institution, to implementing the UAE’s agenda, and most importantly, undermining the conference’s organizational frameworks by forming an alternative political entity that attracted the conference’s bases. In addition, the continued presence of Saleh and his son on the sanctions list continued to allow the forces competing with the conference, specifically the political forces in the areas subject to the Presidential Council, to strike at his popularity by working on the part of his participation as a party, through Saleh and his son, in the coup, along with the group, and challenging the legitimacy of his inclusion in the authority of the Presidential Council. Therefore, the removal of Saleh and his son from The sanctions list means for the General People's Congress Party the inauguration of a new phase of eliminating the legal consequences of its alliance with the group, and thus its political liberation from the restrictions of the relationship, as well as punishment and responsibility. In addition, lifting the ban on the most important symbols of the Saleh family means strengthening the position of the Congress in front of the competing forces, whether the group or other forces. In addition, and most importantly, lifting the sanctions on Brigadier General Ahmed, Saleh's son, means, according to the theories of the Congress leaders and its popular narrative, an opportunity to restore the dreams of inheritance and ruling Yemen. However, regardless of the future role that the Congress and Saleh's family will play, and the impact of that on the political scene, it is certain that lifting the sanctions on Saleh, whether we agree or disagree with him, does not mean changing decisive events in Yemeni history, and of course washing away the crimes of the violators.

(New Arab)