A new attempt to consign South Yemen to the past

A few days ago, President Aidarous al-Zubaidi issued a decision to form the Council of Southern Elders. The committee included prominent Yemeni figures holding the titles of prince, sultan, and sheikh. A year ago, a similar decision was issued to form the Council of the South, with the same person tasked with completing the procedures, albeit in a different capacity. The wording of the two decisions reveals much about the direction that civic and political consciousness is heading in part of Yemen, or perhaps in all of Yemen.

In the face of the massive living challenges plaguing most Yemenis as a result of the collapse of the state since the Houthi-Saleh coup, the failure of the government's various policies, or the Houthis' deliberate impoverishment, the decision appears marginal and part of a series of decisions related to the political elites and their conflicts. However, it is in fact part of the profound transformations in Yemeni society taking place as a result of this war.

Much of this transformation is leading Yemen and the Yemeni people back to the past, whether in the technical sense, in terms of development indicators and the humanitarian situation, or in the political and intellectual sense, as all militia political projects work to perpetuate past perceptions of power, hierarchical relationships between individuals, or the relationships between individuals and the authorities.

The Transitional Council is not far from this. It cannot present a future project from which to derive its legitimacy, but it is searching in the social and political formulas of the past for some form of legitimacy.

Like other projects opposing a unified, democratic Yemen based on citizenship, the consideration of the foundations of political legitimacy remains vague, driven by the power of arms or foreign relations, and these two factors are insufficient to establish legitimacy in the medium and long term.

A broader popular base must be motivated, but this base is primarily concerned with the direct and immediate achievement of certain demands: the activation of public services, the achievement of security, the imposition of the rule of law, accountability, and transparency. Since all parties are unable to meet this popular demand, they, in their political blindness, are seeking to build alliances with influential forces that will overcome their inability to achieve and realize the immediate goals of the masses.

Therefore, relegating Yemen to the past is easier said than done. And herein lies the collective setback. If we look at the history of political and social struggle in the southern governorates, and within the framework of the political project spearheaded by various political movements since the 1950s, it boils down to achieving social progress that restores dignity to individuals, instills them in a constructive relationship based on citizenship, and liberates them from absurd and selfish forms of authoritarianism.

In form and substance, and based on the Transitional Council's socio-political behavior, this political entity, which is growing day by day, is the objective opposite of the southern state it claims to be working to restore.

Since the dawn of independence, the southern state has been based on a direct relationship between individuals and authority, placing the ideologically motivated masses – naturally – at the heart of political action and designing the equation that establishes the social contract.

However, the establishment of a Senate by presidential decree means that the hierarchical structure of visible power in the Transitional Council is sheikhly, not citizen-based. It is a clustered hierarchy with intermediary links separating the senior leadership from the popular base, which will eventually find itself completely excluded from the equation. This model represents a break with Yemeni political and historical reality, not just in a part of Yemen, but across the country as a whole.

However, it is inspired by neighboring oil-producing countries, some of which have established this hierarchical model of governance, a process that has its own historical foundations. Although some, such as Kuwait, have established governance on the basis of citizen participation through elections, they have stumbled, recovered, and then stumbled again.

What is often overlooked is that this hierarchical structure, which is intended to temporarily overcome the legitimacy crisis and the acute crisis of acceptance, particularly in the eastern governorates, does not stem from a genuine consideration of the major economic considerations that have contributed to its consolidation in certain countries due to their wealth and rentier economic model.

Secondly, it will clash with the political legacy acquired since independence, and will spark real conflicts that will not lead to stability.

Another striking aspect of the Transitional Council's trajectory is its structural instability. Yes, there is a need for modernization and for adapting to structural developments and political changes. Only flexible political parties or blocs are capable of facing these challenges. However, the need for relative stability within the structural framework of political entities is a result of rationalizing political decisions, establishing a decision-making mechanism, and establishing a popular-leadership connection.

Before that, it is necessary to have mechanisms that guarantee the emergence of a philosophical-political vision that reflects structural changes.

If we follow the Council's progress since its formation, we find that it has introduced numerous new structures, to the point where it has become a political entity with two legislative chambers. Today, it has added a Senate, after previously adding a House of Commons, without any elections at any of its stages, and without any internal debate involving civil society actors and think tanks.

I do not intend to expose any political entity, but rather to present an example of the crisis in political and partisan life in Yemen. All political entities tend to be catch-all parties.However, its organizational behavior tends to behave like a state without a people or institutions, a dangerous schism that has repercussions for political and partisan life in Yemen. This is because we will be faced with a large crowd of political entities that lack a vision or philosophy, and therefore do not have measurable goals or incentives for individuals, and on top of that, they are empowered by weapons or a totalitarian ideology.

(From the author's page)