Three scenes from Syria

Riad al-Asaad is a Syrian officer who defected from the regime at the beginning of the Syrian revolution in the Arab Spring, and with others founded what was later known as the Free Syrian Army. He reappeared wounded. In his appearance, this veteran officer said: The Syrian armed factions have worked since 2017 to build military institutions capable of victory, which is what achieved their recent victory in deterring aggression. The integration process and the return of defected officers announced by the new government are an indication that it is thinking about all people and opening up hope to all citizens. The factions present in the process of deterring aggression are a sufficient basis for establishing a new army.

In all his statements, he did not mention anything about himself, his role, his position, or even his ambitions. Rather, he dealt with the new reality as a father deals with his sons, and more.

In the second scene: Ahmed al-Sharaa, the commander-in-chief of Operation Deterrence of Aggression, said that he would dissolve the Levant Liberation Committee and the factions that won the Syrian revolution, and would work to limit weapons to the state alone and establish a new, strong army to defend Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is the organization that Ahmed al-Sharaa founded, and through which he was able, in cooperation with the factions, to administer Idlib and establish a small army of revolutionaries with which they liberated Syria and brought down the alliance of the regime, Iran, Russia, and all of Iran’s militias, including Hezbollah.

In the third scene: The Syrian Negotiating Body appeared through new statements from the graves after years of its disappearance, presenting proposals to the Security Council, working to make the Negotiating Body a competing party to the revolutionaries, sharing power with them under UN sponsorship, and calling on the United Nations to take care of everything and hand over everything related to the new phase to the UN envoy to manage the transitional phase.

There are clear paradoxes in the three scenes: Riad al-Asaad represents the movement that witnessed the reality of the armed Syrian revolution, starting from the establishment of the Free Army, until its expansion in the early years and until its defeat after the Russian intervention. Al-Asaad’s awareness, morals and vision provided complete and total recognition of the credit for the victory of the next generation of revolutionaries, i.e. Operation Deterrence of Aggression and the Salvation Government. Al-Asaad praised the efforts of the Salvation Government, and called for standing with it and by its side.

As for Sharaa, who witnessed a complete change in everything in the Syrian revolution during a decade and a half on the personal, organizational, intellectual and institutional levels, he has proven unparalleled success so far. He admitted defeat at an earlier time, studied the reasons for the defeat and fought a serious, honest and persistent personal battle with himself until he achieved victory. At the height of his victory, he does not try at all to preserve the reasons for personal victory in exchange for his control over a fragile state, but rather voluntarily concedes without pressure to build the state.

The Syrian Negotiations Committee and its coalition, who were in exile, are following Assad’s thinking: either we burn the country, or we will burn it. However, they do not have the ability to burn, but to obstruct. They are asking for an international role that has not benefited them for a decade and a half, in the manner of tyrants who hold their positions until death. Moreover, they are offering the sacrifices and achievements of the revolutionaries in exchange for positions in a transitional government that they want to participate in by force, not through negotiations. It is better for the Negotiations Committee to dissolve itself and use its relations and experience with the new government to help overcome the next, more difficult stage, to move towards a model that relies on elections, not on tyranny, foreign support, or the mood of the United Nations.

Among these three scenes in Syria, I fully claim that the first and second models exist in Yemen, and are relied upon for liberation and victory over the Houthis, but the third of them stands at the head of an authority in Yemen that constitutes a real obstacle to liberation efforts, wastes opportunities and drowns in personal conflicts. Therefore, the responsibility of the free Yemenis in confronting and defeating the Houthis, and overcoming the stage of destructive agreements at the level of the Leadership Council and the Yemeni government, doubles.