From chaos to organization.. How did the revolutionaries succeed in overthrowing the Assad regime?

The Syrian opposition officially announces the liberation of Damascus and the fall of Bashar al-Assad, 11 days after the start of the “Deterrence of Aggression” battle. This event, which millions had been waiting for, was the result of years of work and part of the interactions of the scene over 13 years, and would not have happened at this level without years of factional competition and jihadist struggle. While most analyses suggest that the liberation was due to the weakness of the Assad regime and its allies and the Syrian opposition’s exploitation of the international and regional circumstances.

But a great victory with such speed, organizational and tactical level, and behavioral discipline, cannot succeed due to these factors alone. Also, according to military logic, the decision to launch a major military operation such as “deterring aggression” is not taken so quickly.

The developments that took place in the opposition itself, specifically during the five years before the liberation, had a major, if not decisive, impact. Therefore, this report tells the story from the inside, and reads the liberation scene within the episodes that preceded it. It also analyzes the factors, intellectual, religious, and social reforms, and the psychological preparations that paved the way for this achievement.

This report also raises a number of questions. First, what factors contributed to the rapid success of the Syrian armed opposition on the ground? Were there specific reasons that gave them an advantage, or did they receive support from foreign parties? Second, do we attribute these developments and this victory to the personal qualities of the opposition leaders themselves, or were there other factors that played a role in this victory?

Institutionalizing the Revolution: A Technocratic Government

By early 2020, most of the fronts had stabilized and reached the contact lines from which “Deterrence of Aggression” was launched in 2024. Since the ceasefire, the situation has remained relatively calm, although some clashes have occurred on the front lines.

The opposition has made concerted efforts to establish a successful civil administration and bureaucratic reform towards integration and efficiency in the areas it controls. In May 2021, while meeting with a delegation of tribal sheikhs, al-Jolani stated that the current phase is an era of building institutions that will pave the way for achieving ultimate victory.

Al-Jolani saw the revolution as more than just a military battle, and he believed that the space granted after the ceasefire would help qualify cadres and build greater capabilities and expertise, which would lead to “the complete liberation of Syria,” as he put it in July 2022. Al-Jolani stated on May 15, 2021: “Every institution we build in the liberated areas is a step towards Damascus... Our battle is on all levels.”

In fact, the opposition tried to build a quasi-state project in the liberated areas that includes all the residents, and for this reason, the establishment of a technocratic civil government called the Salvation Government to rule Idlib constitutes a very important stage in the history of the Syrian revolution, according to al-Jolani, in his speech before the ministers of the Syrian Salvation Government.

Before the establishment of the Syrian Salvation Government, services were managed by local councils that were established after the revolution in 2011, but they did not work as efficiently as al-Jolani wanted, so the Salvation Government was established at the end of 2017 to move from the model of independent councils to a new central government apparatus.

The Salvation Government is responsible for civil affairs, and has a group of ministries such as the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice and Religious Affairs, and an official gazette of decrees and laws, etc., and the members of this government are among the Syrian intellectuals and academics.

Thus, there was an accumulation of a variety of resources and funds that not only enabled the opposition to stabilize, but these coffers were used for a major military operation such as the “deterrence of aggression” operation.

This does not mean that there are no cases of opposition to this civil administration, but despite the many failures of this experiment, it did not weaken society from within. For example, the continuation of demonstrations for about 8 months in Idlib against Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham suggests that many means of expression have not been suppressed, and that there is some breathing space for this society.

The Salvation Government model may not be perfect, but the lives of local residents were better than before, especially in terms of security, and also compared to the areas of the National Army in the north, and many local residents expressed their satisfaction with the relative security and stability and the presence of a single civilian authority.

Over time and based on the lessons learned, this government has become more capable and experienced in confronting the crises it has faced, noting that this administration and its individuals with diverse skills and experiences are the ones who practically handle administrative affairs today in the newly liberated areas.

Therefore, the role of civil society, which has added a variety of skills to the armed opposition and is now playing a major role, should not be neglected. When the Military Operations Department announced Operation “Deterrence of Aggression,” not only did the military forces fight professionally, but immediately after the announcement, the Salvation Government activated an “Emergency Response” committee to help with any repercussions of the military campaign. This committee, which was established in March 2020, is an emergency apparatus between the various ministries.

Then, in the hours following “deterrence of aggression,” the Ministry of Development and Humanitarian Affairs immediately began preparing new tents for internally displaced persons from the regime’s bombing campaign, provided telephone numbers in villages and cities for easy contact, and the Emergency Committee made tremendous efforts to mobilize all medical resources and speed up the work of bakeries to meet the needs of the local population.

It is really remarkable that after the liberation of Aleppo, the “Emergency Response Committee” was able to quickly alleviate the bread crisis by sending 100,000 loaves of bread from Idlib bakeries to Aleppo. The “Emergency Response Committee” also, through the E-Clean Foundation, cleaned up the rubble from the airstrikes of the regime and Russia, and also cleaned the streets of the newly liberated areas, which caught the attention of Christians and was accepted by them.

On December 1, the Director of Public Relations in the Syrian Salvation Government, Abdul Rahman Muhammad, promised the local residents of Aleppo to begin restoring and restoring service sectors to work, including communications, electricity, water supply, cleaning, bakery support, transportation, and the removal of explosive remnants, and this is certainly based on their experience in the first liberated areas.

Therefore, it is possible to say that the battle of “deterring aggression” has reaped the results of about 5 years of effort. It is important to note that the day after the liberation of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus, the security services affiliated with the Salvation Government began deploying traffic police and elements from the Ministry of Interior in different locations in these cities, to protect institutions and avoid vacuum and chaos.

Even Abu Muhammad al-Julani, in his last public appearance with the new government, tried to convince or reassure al-Jalali that they had experience from managing the Salvation Government in Idlib, and had succeeded in many files.

Indeed, al-Julani’s vision has already been realized when he believed that these projects were a step toward Damascus. Years ago, he ordered the Salvation Government Council to work on making sure that institutions in Idlib are ready to expand once new lands are liberated. He said in July 2022: “When we liberate large areas, and I see that coming soon… these institutions should be ready to fill the void quickly, and people should feel the big difference in security, education, health, agriculture, the economy, and in all aspects of life within a few weeks.”

Transformation from faction to quasi-state

The success of any armed opposition is not determined solely by the mere carrying of weapons. The necessities of war and the changing political landscape have forced most opposition factions to draw on local support networks, to cooperate with NGOs and international institutions, and most importantly to adapt or balance ideology with changing circumstances.

These factors combined contributed to the ideological development of many factions, and in the words of Obaida Ghadhban: “During the past four years, there was no state of stagnation or peace in Idlib, but rather a state of internal interaction and conflict.”

In fact, HTS realized the dilemma faced by the options of many jihadist groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the failure of these organizations to achieve a specific strategic goal. Therefore, in addition to the activity on the ground, HTS established a political affairs department and a special office to manage external relations, including humanitarian organizations and UN agencies. It tried to open channels for coordination with regional and international parties, and thus it was no longer completely disconnected from the facts of the situation.

In fact, there was a very balanced media discourse at the internal and external levels. In many statements, Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham stressed that it does not threaten other countries, but rather seeks cooperation. In order not to antagonize others or incite them against it, it stressed that its main enemies are the regime, the Iranian militias, and Russia. These changes have angered Salafi-jihadist figures, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who denounced Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham because of what he considered a difference in ideology.

It is worth noting that the organization and the Salvation Government were not in fact completely in line with the Western or Turkish climate as is rumored. For example, Abu Muhammad al-Julani publicly expressed his concern about the Turkish rapprochement with the regime, and he was the first leader of the factions to rush to criticize the Turkish policy of rapprochement with Bashar al-Assad, and promised to “continue fighting until the liberation of Damascus.” The organization also congratulated the Taliban movement on the success of its recent battle against America, and many of its leaders mourned Ayman al-Zawahiri.

From another perspective, the Authority and the Salvation Government worked on a coherent media strategy, abandoning traditional channels and moving in another direction towards unofficial channels on social media and searching for influential people and communicating with them. Consequently, there were groups of media centers not directly affiliated with the Authority.

In fact, it was clear that the media situation had improved significantly in the “deterrence of aggression” battle, especially the leaking of certain rumors to direct attention in other directions, and then moving on different axes. This is also a large information and media organization that indicates the continuous development of the Syrian opposition.

Trimming the Factions: The Centrality of War and Peace Decisions

HTS also took decisive action against ISIS networks that went to northwestern Syria after 2019, and in June 2020 it also dismantled al-Qaeda’s attempt to build a new branch in Syria called Guardians of Religion.

The military victory of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham over these factions established it as the dominant group, and imposed the Salvation Government on all areas previously controlled by various factions, including Ahrar al-Sham. The entirety of Idlib came under the administrative control of the Salvation Government, putting an end to the fighting between the factions.

Although some of the actions taken by the Authority were hostile to other factions that it absorbed or controlled by force, they strengthened the unity of political and military decision-making in the future and reduced the state of fragmentation, especially since these factions adopted conflicting identities and projects and had little in common. Many denounced the Authority’s philosophy of overcoming other factions, and it was accused of committing many violations.

In the end, al-Julani forced the factions to commit to a single military operations room so that the state of fragmentation that existed in the last defeat in 2020 would not be repeated. As for some of the factions that refused to join this military project, they were completely removed and their leaders arrested. Among these groups is the Jund al-Sham group led by Muslim al-Shishani. When the latter refused to integrate into this project, the organization was easily dismantled by the organization.

Thus, there is no longer a situation of making decisions individually as before, or for foreign factions to operate independently of the local leadership, and even if the organizational unity of the factions is not achieved, there is more institutional military coordination between them, as there is now a unified central force that controls the decision of war and peace and the sharing of resources and spoils, and no strategic decision regarding military operations is made except by referring to the center, which is what formed the scene of “deterring aggression” in 2024.

Ministry of Defense: Shifting from factionalism to a more professional force

The initial phase of the conflict, in which fragmentation hampered the ability of factions to coordinate effectively, is gone. Instead of foreign fighters taking prominent roles, they are replaced by Syrian jihadists, and the state of the revolution has moved from chaotic and random to a more professional state, as a joint military defense and forces equipped to manage front lines and able to deploy heavy weapons and coordinate among themselves.

While the Salvation Government does not have a Ministry of Defense, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has sought tools and means to develop military action, so in December 2021 it established a military academy for the liberated areas, which included Syrian soldiers who defected from the Syrian regime and professional jihadists from Eurasia, and they worked to improve the skills of opposition fighters.

In September 2022, on the occasion of the graduation of the first batch of officers, al-Julani told the officers that due to the need to increase support for the battle against the Assad regime, they decided to establish this military college to add experience to the mujahideen in military sciences and martial arts and advance in self-manufacturing military industry. He also indicated that the graduates of this college would be the nucleus of the revolutionary army that would liberate Syria.

That is, they were united in opinion and in military action, and thus there was a state of centralization and a level of planning, discipline and receiving orders that did not exist before, and this state, according to al-Julani, is what achieved this rapid victory in the liberation battle. Faced with this creative model of the armed opposition, the regime was unable to develop anything despite the difference in capabilities between them.

We conclude by saying, in light of the above, that the liberation of Damascus came after years of political and organizational development of the Syrian factions and their experience gained from engaging in fighting for more than 13 years, in addition to building a political project that combines jihad and reform, and most importantly, an attempt to move from the reality of fragmentation that was prevalent to a new reality.

The successes achieved by the armed opposition were not only due to its military prowess, but also due to the change in the political and administrative fields, and the interaction of the media and political discourse with the administrative structure, governance and military aspect during the past five years. What we are witnessing today is the result of five years of military preparation and equipment and the integration of energies and institutions combined, which made the liberation battle possible.

Source: Noon Post