The last hours of Bashar al-Assad's rule... This is how the dominoes of the ousted regime fell

The "Deterrence of Aggression" operation in Syria toppled the regime of ousted President Bashar al-Assad on December 8, ending decades of rule by the Assad family in Syria. Simply put, the name means deterring a potential aggression by regime forces and militias against the areas from which the operation was launched, namely Idlib and its surroundings, and what was previously known as the "Fourth De-escalation Zone", which includes the entire Idlib province, the western and southern countryside of Aleppo, the northern and western countryside of Hama, and a pocket in the eastern countryside of Latakia.

This was an operation that was planned to be carried out about five months before its actual launch on November 27 of last year, while preparations for it had been underway for about two years. The need for it increased with the start of the clear mobilization of regime forces on the lines of contact with the Syrian opposition forces in Idlib and its surroundings, which were brought together by the “Al-Fath Al-Mubin” operations room, which was formed from several factions, the largest of which was “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham”, and hence the final name of the operation “Deterrence of Aggression”.

However, the mobilization of regime forces and Russian and Iranian militias on the front lines was one of three reasons that prompted the organization and the opposition factions in Idlib to engage in this battle. The first was the desire of Ahmed al-Sharaa, the leader of the organization, to expand control towards areas that were originally considered part of the fourth de-escalation zone, before the regime and Iranian and Russian militias nibbled at them in successive battles starting from mid-2018 until the ceasefire concluded between Russia and Turkey on March 5, 2020.

The idea of expansion for Al-Sharaa was also due to two goals: the first was to expand economic activity after the success of the Salvation Government that he established deep in Idlib, in building an acceptable infrastructure that can be expanded and worked on, to increase the gains of the Salvation Government and then Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, including increasing projects and creating job opportunities that reduce unemployment. The second goal aims to solve the problem of overcrowding and camps after the repeated waves of displacement, especially during the battles of 2019 and 2020, which led to the displacement of nearly two million civilians, all from the areas of the southern and eastern Idlib countryside, western and southern Aleppo, and northern and western Hama, which fall within the fourth de-escalation zone that Turkey was unable to protect, given that it is a "guarantor" of it, from the attack of the regime and the Russians despite the spread of Turkish points in it, and voices began to rise from the displaced to pressure the military to return them to their homes, after poverty, destitution and difficult humanitarian conditions ravaged them as a result of displacement.

The second reason behind the “deterrence of aggression” operation lies in the organization’s desire to obstruct the normalization process between Turkey and the regime, which Ankara has sought with clear effort over the past year, especially during the latter half of it, as Shara wanted to shuffle the cards on the ground to be reflected in the corridors of politics, especially since Turkey has great influence over the opposition factions in its areas of influence, i.e. the “National Army” factions, most of which appeared to be in a position of submission to the Turkish desire for rapprochement with the regime.

The last reason, as explained above, was to actually deter aggression, after the regime tried to give the impression that it had the intention or the ability to expand, despite its actual inability to do so.

Where is Türkiye in all this?

It should be noted that the military coordination between Turkey on the one hand, and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and the Idlib factions on the other hand, has been very weak, if not non-existent, in the last three years. While the Turkish army controls the areas of influence of the National Army in the countryside of Aleppo, Raqqa and Hasakah, it does not have that power over the Idlib factions and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in particular, as communication between Ankara and the organization is limited to security communication only, specifically through the Turkish intelligence service.

Before the operation, the organization sent two letters to Ankara, the first of which was about five months ago, requesting cover or a green light to begin limited work, without the need for military or logistical support, but the Turkish response was absolutely negative because this would affect the political path in Astana, which led to the normalization process between the regime and Ankara. Turkey also brought up the issue of the influx of refugees in the event that the regime and the Russians became brutal in bombing civilian areas as before. At that time, the committee postponed, but did not cancel the idea of the operation, but Bashar al-Assad’s refusal to sit at the negotiating table with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Ankara receiving signals that Assad would not make any concessions, especially regarding the return of refugees and finding a formula, even at the minimum level, to implement some political solutions and involve the opposition, changed the Turkish mood, so the second message was on its way to Ankara several days before the operation, and the following response was: “You have 72 hours to achieve results on the ground, then you will receive our support and blessing, and if you are unable to achieve results, we will intervene to stop the battle in your favor (i.e. without a major reaction against you, especially from the Russians), but in return you will be forced to agree to what we will negotiate with the regime.”

The sources that informed Al-Araby Al-Jadeed of these two messages do not know what the response of the organization was to the formula that was included in Ankara’s responses to the second message, but the battle has begun, and its scope was very limited in the first stage, according to the same sources, which is a small part of the western countryside of Aleppo, to control several villages starting from the 46th Regiment and expand control north and south of it towards Aleppo Governorate, reaching the de-escalation borders west of Aleppo, which were drawn by the Astana table, and then the 2018 Sochi Agreement between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and if progress is achieved on this front, another axis will be opened towards the southern countryside of Idlib, starting from Saraqib in the middle of Idlib Governorate, to launch towards the south of the governorate.

What happened next?

The regime forces seemed exhausted, especially psychologically, while the complacency had affected their readiness, and the fortifications of those forces quickly collapsed, without the regime and its Russian and Iranian allies being able to comprehend what had happened. While Moscow was preoccupied with the battles in eastern Ukraine, the influence of Russian military experts and advisors was non-existent on Syrian soil, and all the Russians could do was strike the supply lines of the rapidly advancing opposition forces in Aleppo. This would have been useful had the regime forces not withdrawn in a random and disorganized manner from their points and camps on the outskirts of Aleppo, leaving behind dozens of tanks and cannons, and tons of various ammunition. At that time, the opposition forces did not need supply lines, they only needed fuel to operate the captured vehicles to continue the battle with them, knowing that the regime forces did not have enough fuel to withdraw the vehicles, according to the soldiers who surrendered to the opposition fighters.

Controlling Aleppo, and then expanding southwards by controlling the entire administrative borders of Idlib Governorate and heading towards Hama, made Bashar al-Assad realise the reality separate from him, especially since the signals of the allies abandoning him had begun to arrive, which he confirmed after his Foreign Minister Bassam al-Sabbagh met with his Iraqi and Iranian counterparts in Baghdad on the evening of December 6. Assad had hoped that this meeting would lead to decisions from Iraq and Iran to send support forces, but the words of the Iraqi and Iranian ministers at the press conference that followed the meeting were enough to tell him to “manage yourself, we have nothing but condemnation, denunciation and sympathy.”

Bashar al-Assad's latest attempts to defend his regime

Bashar al-Assad would not wait for the Doha meeting the next day, because he knew its results based on previous signals. He began working on two plans: the first: preparing for an escape, and the second: mobilizing from within his regime’s bases on the coast to throw them into the battle and defend the regime on the outskirts of Homs in the center of the country. He assigned his economic advisor, Yassar Ibrahim, to work on this last plan. He communicated with most of the leaders of the gangs and allied militias on the coast, who were benefiting from the regime, whether by fighting with it and “looting” the areas controlled after that, or through the Captagon trade, which has become a registered trademark in Bashar al-Assad’s name in the world.

Yasar Ibrahim asked, specifically from members of the Assad family, to recruit anyone who could be recruited through money, while the weapons would be provided through the palace and the Fourth Division. At that time, Ibrahim received responses that they were ready if money was available for the fighters to be recruited, announcing that they needed about three million dollars per month for the salaries and expenses of the fighters. Ibrahim returned to Bashar al-Assad and received instructions from him, which were to find the Assad family to finance this plan through "protection money" from economists and merchants. At that time, the Assad family knew that it was too late to intimidate the merchants and economists to withdraw money from them, and that Bashar would not release his money to defend his rule, so they fled with their families to the mountains. At that time, the regime forces collapsed in Homs, and Damascus and its countryside began to slip out of control in favor of the opposition. Bashar al-Assad had the first plan in place, and all that was missing was some arrangements with the Russian embassy for the way out and to reach Hmeimim, then escape and flee to Russia.

This is how Bashar al-Assad and his regime fell, and even though it happened in 11 days, 14 years of Syrian resistance, at all levels and forms, were disintegrating this filthiest regime in the world, before the "aggression deterrence" was able to finish it off.

New Arab