US Center: Washington must provide the Yemeni army with the necessary weapons to defeat the Houthis

The American Middle East Forum research center said that the United States must arm the Yemenis with the necessary tools to defeat the Iranian-backed terrorist group.

The center published an analysis by researcher Eric Navarro entitled: Can Yemenis defeat the Houthis?, in which he considered that reclassifying the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization is an opportunity for the Yemeni government to take the initiative.

The report, translated by "Yemeni Youth Net", said that the fighting against the Houthis has been going on for more than a decade. The Iranian-backed terrorist group remains based in Sanaa and most of northern Yemen, continues to control the port of Hodeidah, and is now seeking to control Yemen's modest oil fields around Marib.

The continued presence of the Houthis, he added, indicates that previous strategies have not worked. The Biden administration’s diplomatic efforts have failed. Its delisting of the Houthis from the list of foreign terrorist organizations has only emboldened the group.

Omani mediation also did not succeed. The use of the US Navy in freedom of navigation operations was more of a military “virtue” gesture than a long-term solution.

“President Donald Trump has re-designated the Houthis as a terrorist group,” he continued. “While he is calling on regional allies around the world to defend themselves, rather than rely on the United States to provide a defensive umbrella, he is also prepared to give allies what they need to accomplish their mission.”

The writer stressed that "the Yemeni army must have the ability to monitor, deter and strike Houthi forces independently, without relying on Western intervention."

“Here is an opportunity,” he said. “Relying solely on US military forces and those of its allies is not easy. The internationally recognized Yemeni government must take the lead in securing its territory.”

He noted that the Yemeni government has shown its willingness to fight, but in the absence of appropriate weapons, it remains unable to possess them. If Washington is serious about restoring deterrence, protecting global trade, and confronting Iranian expansion, it must provide the Yemenis with the tools necessary to achieve victory.

He added that the Houthis' asymmetric tactics - missile strikes, drone swarms, small boat attacks, and naval mines - require a multi-layered defense strategy.

The Yemeni military must have the ability to monitor, deter, and strike Houthi forces independently, without relying on Western intervention every time Tehran escalates its actions.

He stressed that this means integrating missile defense, air power, naval assets, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance platforms, and special forces into a cohesive force.

Phase One: Intelligence Capabilities

The writer explained that during the first six months, the focus should be on intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, counter-drone systems, and maritime patrol assets to disrupt Houthi operations before they can strike.

This includes MQ-9 Reaper drones operated by US forces for real-time intelligence and precision strikes against Houthi missile launch sites.

It also includes electronic warfare systems to disable Houthi drones and missile guidance systems, and fast attack boats armed with anti-ship missiles to counter Houthi boat attacks in the Red Sea.

With sustained investment over the next year, Yemen could begin deploying offensive strike and demining capabilities. This could entail drones, produced locally by military contractors such as EDGE Group in the UAE and SAMI in Saudi Arabia, to reduce reliance on Western supply chains.

In addition, according to the writer, this phase should include the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System ( HIMARS ) to strike Houthi missile launch sites before they can target international shipping.

It also includes short-range air defense ( SHORAD ) systems, such as the Avenger , to protect Yemeni forces from drones and missile strikes, and mine countermeasure ships to remove sea mines that threaten commercial and military shipping lanes.

Building a capable Yemeni force will not be an easy task, the writer said, but a decade of failures should have proven that there are no shortcuts.

Phase 2: Integrating defensive and offensive capabilities

In order for Yemeni forces to be able to completely neutralize the Houthi threat and prevent the entrenchment of an Iranian presence in the long term, they must, after eighteen months of the strategy’s inception, integrate advanced air defense and offensive capabilities, according to the author.

He added that this includes the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System ( NASAMS ) or the Patriot PAC-3 missile defense systems. To intercept ballistic and cruise missile attacks on Yemeni ports and air bases.

In addition to Harbin missiles or Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles ( LRASMs ) to target Houthi naval assets and missile launchers, and advanced F-16 or F/A-18 fighter jets – not necessarily by the Yemenis themselves, but through sorties conducted by security partners as part of joint operations.

He explained that throughout this process, Yemen must also develop special operations capabilities and cyber warfare tools to disrupt Houthi missile networks, while leveraging intelligence sharing from the United States and regional partners.

Special Operations Forces teams could be used in maritime interdiction operations and sabotage of Houthi naval assets, while cyber and electronic countermeasures could disable missile guidance systems and jam drone communications.

He pointed out that building a Yemeni force capable of doing this will not be an easy task, but a decade of failures must prove to us that shortcuts are not possible.

Deploying these systems will require cooperation between the United States, its Gulf partners, and European defense companies—with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates likely to act as intermediaries.

But challenges remain. Yemen’s military infrastructure is in a state of disrepair. Ports, air bases, and supply chains remain vulnerable to Houthi attacks, requiring immediate investment in logistics and force protection.

Diversion of weapons to their original destinations poses a real risk. Without proper oversight, advanced systems could fall into the hands of unscrupulous actors, including al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. But the United States has experience with end-use monitoring and training programs.

But could Iran escalate its position? As Yemen bolsters its military, Tehran could respond with more advanced missiles, drones and sabotage.

Here, Washington must be prepared to confront any Iranian aggression, militarily and diplomatically. But the fall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the defeats of Hezbollah are restoring momentum to the anti-Islamic Republic coalition.

US naval operations in the Gulf of Aden could halt Iranian resupply, and diplomatic pressure on Oman could halt Muscat’s double game.

The writer concluded his report by pointing out that the Trump administration realizes that securing the Red Sea and crushing the Houthi aggression requires action, not appeasement.