American magazine: Washington needs a new strategy that focuses on choking off military supplies to the Houthis and supporting the Yemeni government

The American magazine Foreign Policy said that the United States of America needs a new strategy that focuses on the sources of the growing power of the Houthis and not only on its symptoms that appear in the Red Sea, stressing that "the United States' mission to deter and weaken the Houthis has not succeeded."

The magazine published an analysis prepared by Beth Sanner, former Deputy Director of National Intelligence in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Jennifer Kavanagh, Director of Military Analysis and Senior Fellow at Defense Priorities.

The analysis, translated by "Yemeni Youth Net", said that the next US administration will need to choke off the Houthis' military supplies and income, which they use to finance local arms production and other projects.

“The United States and Israel should coordinate any further military strikes against Houthi capabilities, and military action should be precisely targeted to disrupt Houthi operations to the greatest extent possible, without harming civilians,” he added, noting that covert operations, for example against Iranian intelligence vessels and senior Houthi leaders and financiers, would be preferable.

He also stressed the need for efforts to also support Yemeni groups, especially the internationally recognized government, which opposes the Houthis, adding: "Regional countries can help build their defenses to prevent the Houthis from seizing Yemen's oil and gas fields."

Analysis text:

The U.S. mission to deter and weaken the Houthis has not succeeded. In the last week of 2024, the militant group launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on Israel and Red Sea shipping lanes, drawing U.S. strikes on military targets on Yemen’s coast.

In all, in December alone, the Houthis fired on several U.S. naval and commercial ships, and carried out ten drone and missile attacks on Israel.

Israel and the United States have responded five times in total, destroying Houthi port and energy infrastructure and military sites, but the Houthis continue to fire. In the process, friendly fire shot down a U.S. FA-18 fighter jet, fortunately its crew survived. This cost-benefit ratio is not sustainable. Houthi operations and ambitions have not been seriously eroded, but U.S. military readiness and reputation have.

Washington needs a new strategy, one that focuses on the Houthis’ growing sources of power and not just their symptoms in the Red Sea.

Just over a year ago, in December 2023, Washington created a multinational operation to defend commercial shipping and restore freedom of navigation in the wake of Houthi attacks that threatened about 12 percent of global shipping passing through the chokepoint known as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The Houthis say their goal is to force Israel to end its war in Gaza, but they have targeted international shipping indiscriminately.

After the failure of a UN Security Council resolution – adopted last January, despite China and Russia abstaining – to halt the Houthi campaign, Washington and London added an offensive dimension, Operation Poseidon Archer, to the deterioration of Houthi military capabilities.

Yet these U.S.-led operations have received little support from partners inside and outside the region—even from those most affected. Meanwhile, ships flying the flags of Russia, China, and illicit traders serving those countries, and Iran, sail largely undisturbed after paying or negotiating safe passage.

In August, nine months after the U.S. military campaign began, the U.S. Navy commander in the Middle East, Vice Admiral George Wikoff, publicly declared that U.S. defensive efforts and strikes would not deter the Houthis. “The solution will not come at the end of the weapons system,” he said.

This conclusion has not changed much. Attacks on shipping have fallen largely because the number of targets has fallen – shipping has fallen by about two-thirds – but freedom of navigation has not been restored.

Sporadic attacks, including an alleged December 27 strike on the Maersk container ship in the Arabian Sea and a December 31 attack on the US aircraft carrier Harry S. Truman, continue to force most Western shipping to take longer, more expensive but safer routes around the southern tip of Africa.

Meanwhile, the Houthis have stepped up direct missile and drone attacks on Israel in recent weeks. These attacks have received less attention than the Red Sea strikes, but the Houthis have fired more than 200 missiles and 170 drones at Israel since Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack.

Almost all attacks on Israel were intercepted, but one Israeli was killed and dozens were wounded—mostly by falling debris and repeated runs to shelters.

While the Houthis can continue their relatively cheap drone and missile attacks and withstand counterattacks indefinitely, the United States is burning through billions of dollars and years of scarce munitions production that would be needed to fight a war in the Pacific. Washington may be spending as much as $570 million a month on a mission that has failed to “move the needle” on the threat.

These operations have drained readiness by forcing U.S. Navy ships and aircraft carriers into extended deployments, leading to time-consuming repairs, shrinking the available fleet, and shortening the life of ships. And exhausting personnel risks making mistakes.

The benefits of U.S. military action against the Houthis are ambiguous. U.S. trade is not heavily dependent on Persian Gulf routes, and U.S.-flagged ships have avoided the region entirely since January 2024, with only three exceptions.

Even with most trade diverted for a year, the Red Sea disruption has had no lasting impact on U.S. oil prices or inflation. Moreover, the persistence of a multinational campaign that has failed to attract support from most allies and partners or achieve the stated goal of protecting freedom of navigation makes Washington look impotent at best.

The next U.S. administration must replace the current failed military campaign with a permanent solution that strangles Houthi revenue streams; holds the group’s main patron, Iran, accountable; and demands that allies and partners play a greater role and ultimately take a leadership role in these efforts and in protecting regional shipping. This will not be quick or easy, but the Houthi challenge will only grow in the absence of a strategy.

Most important, the next administration will need to choke off the Houthis’ military supplies and income, which they use to fund domestic arms production and other projects. A U.S. naval embargo, or quarantine, as some have called it, is unrealistic; only about 20 Iranian smuggling vessels were seized between 2015 and 2024.

Additional US sanctions also won’t help because the Houthis’ sources of income – illicit trade and heavy domestic taxation – remain largely outside the international financial system.

Focusing on Houthi financing; service providers such as brokers, flag states, owners, classification societies; and transit points in collaboration with regional, European, and Asian partners would be more feasible.

US President-elect Donald Trump could leverage his strong personal relationships with regional leaders to push Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India to crack down on Houthi financial backers and logistics contracts.

The policy of containing the Houthis also aligns with concerns among European and other coastal states about the growing network of Russian and Iranian tanker fleets that evade sanctions and threaten maritime safety. Curbing this illicit shipping would cut off a major source of Houthi revenue and reduce the oil income on which Moscow and Tehran depend.

Washington should build a truly multinational naval presence that is better designed to interdict Houthi supply lines and share the burden of defending freedom of navigation.

This would be more plausible and feasible if it were built on the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, which comprises 46 nations and focuses on counter-piracy and counter-smuggling, rather than as a separate Houthi mission. Negotiating with regional partners to gain their consent and terms of participation would be essential.

One step could include helping Riyadh revitalize its moribund regional council, set up in 2020 to tackle piracy and smuggling. Others include boosting cooperation with and between Brussels and New Delhi to bolster their recent and ongoing maritime security operations in the region and making Turkey more central, given its growing influence in the Horn of Africa.

As the United States intensifies these multilateral efforts, it must resize its naval presence, withdrawing carrier groups but maintaining a smaller, fit-for-purpose force, such as a few guided-missile destroyers supported by smaller patrol ships and ample naval and air drones.

Efforts should also be made to support Yemeni groups, especially the internationally recognized government, that oppose the Houthis. Regional states could help build their own defenses to prevent the Houthis from seizing Yemen’s oil and gas fields, which would provide the group with resources for its regional ambitions.

Washington may have to act as a catalyst, such as by supporting the Yemeni government’s efforts to cut off the Houthis’ access to the international banking system. But ultimately, regional governments must take the lead.

There is no doubt that the American role must be an extension of a broader strategy to weaken Iran’s regional influence. This means holding Iran, the main driver of the Houthis’ actions, responsible for the group’s attacks through economic and diplomatic sanctions.

The United States and Israel should coordinate any further military strikes against Houthi capabilities, and military action should be carefully targeted to disrupt Houthi operations as much as possible without harming civilians. Covert operations, for example against Iranian intelligence vessels and senior Houthi leaders and financiers, are preferable.

This would deny the Houthis the legitimacy they gain from withstanding airstrikes with potentially similar effects. Intelligence sharing between the United States and its partners to guide such operations should be expanded and expanded. Such reciprocal ties could expand Washington’s reach at low cost and build regional relationships, including between Israel and Arab partners, designed to endure long after the Houthi campaign ends.

It is time to end the U.S. military campaign in the Red Sea—but ignoring the Houthi threat entirely would be strategic folly. If the Houthis are left unchecked, they could easily derail Trump’s other priorities in the Middle East, including expanding the Abraham Accords and containing Iran. Ultimately, it would be in Trump’s interest to take the challenges in Yemen seriously and chart a course for managing them.