Houthi attacks on US MQ-9 aircraft: How do they serve their local and regional agenda?

An American report stated that the allegations of the Houthis shooting down the American MQ-9 drones serves their goals at the local level, in addition to their regional and international agenda, through their relationship with Iran and other opponents of the United States of America.

On December 28, 2024, a Houthi spokesman announced that they had shot down a US MQ-9 Reaper drone flying over Yemen’s Al Bayda Governorate with a surface-to-air missile. Four days later, the Houthis boasted of shooting down a second US drone in Marib, the first Houthi strike of a drone of the same type in 2025.

According to a report by the Atlantic Council, translated by Yemen Youth Net, “These attacks represent the latest in a long series of successful Houthi strikes against American drones since the beginning of the war between Israel and Hamas, highlighting the Houthis’ growing offensive capabilities.”

The US report indicated that, since November 2023, the Houthis have succeeded in turning the downing of MQ-9 drones into promotional propaganda to promote their military performance locally and abroad.

If the Houthis conclude that continued attacks on U.S. aircraft are paying off, they are likely to intensify their attacks on U.S. assets, and the group’s determination to escalate the military confrontation with Washington could be strong, the report said.

In an attempt to continue the strikes On February 19, the Houthis reportedly fired surface-to-air missiles at a US F-16 fighter jet and an MQ-9 drone (but the missiles did not hit their targets).

For the Houthis, imposing heavy losses on the US drone fleet serves tactical, strategic and symbolic goals at the local and regional levels. According to the report, “strikes against MQ-9 drones weaken US intelligence and targeting systems and help the Houthis bolster local and regional support.”

"With the Houthis' ties to China, Russia and Iran, downed MQ-9s could end up in the hands of US adversaries," the report said, noting that "the US needs to adjust its MQ-9 deployment strategy to ensure they are less vulnerable to attacks by the militant group."

Use MQ-9 aircraft in Yemen

Increased attacks on US drones and an anti-shipping campaign are key elements of the Houthis’ latest offensive. Since mid-November 2023, the Houthis have held freedom of navigation and maritime commerce in the Red Sea hostage, launching attacks on commercial vessels.

By launching their anti-shipping campaign, the Houthis have dealt a severe blow to maritime traffic in the commercial artery linking the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean, and have expanded their targets to include any vessel owned or operated by international shipping lines whose ships serve Israeli ports.

Since 2002, the United States has regularly deployed drones such as the MQ-9 for surveillance and strike missions in Yemen, particularly to gather intelligence and eliminate operatives of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Despite their extended deployment, the number of US drones lost to enemy fire has been small, with the Houthis shooting down just three MQ-9s between 2017 and 2019.

During the Houthi campaign against maritime navigation, there has been a marked escalation in the group’s tactical proficiency against US drones. Since November 2023, the Houthis have claimed responsibility for shooting down 14 MQ-9 drones, in a series of attacks targeting US assets primarily in Marib and Saada governorates.

The increased tempo and success rate of Houthi attacks on US drones is unprecedented, demonstrating the militia’s improved targeting skills and expanding offensive capabilities.

While it is not clear what exactly is involved in the Houthi missile force, and thus what enhances this offensive capability, a rough idea can be gleaned from Houthi military parades and from the seizure of military materials from dhows smuggling lethal aid from Iran.

The Houthis' arsenal of surface-to-air missiles includes Russian-made missiles from pre-war Yemeni military stockpiles, such as the SA-6/Faster (Innovator) surface-to-air missile and the Thaqib (Piercer) family of missiles, in addition to which the Houthis claim to produce indigenous missile designs.

However, these designs are either variants of Iranian weapon systems or based on Iranian technology, such as the Sayyad-2C missile, the Saqr series (Iranian 358 missile), and the Barq missile family (Iranian Bird series).

Houthi strategy

Tactically, the Houthis’ downing of MQ-9 drones is primarily aimed at blinding US intelligence and targeting systems, which US forces rely on to collect data and plan joint airstrikes with the UK on hostile ground targets in Houthi-controlled territory.

Although designed as a first-class “hunt-and-kill” drone, the MQ-9 also plays a critical role in intelligence gathering, surveillance and identification thanks to its 24-hour endurance and maximum operational altitude of 50,000 feet.

The US and British precision strikes, which targeted Houthi radars and the group’s storage and launch sites, relied on the MQ-9 aircraft, which played a major role in hitting underground facilities and hideouts in the rugged mountainous areas of Yemen. Because the Houthis hide strategic sites, the Western coalition relied on drones to gather actionable intelligence on military installations.

Houthi propaganda

For the Houthis, the downing of the US drone also has symbolic value. Direct confrontation with the US and Israel is an integral part of their ideological foundation, and they want to be seen as able to stand up to the US. To this end, the Houthis have been heavily promoting the downing of the MQ-9.

For example, as Mohammed Al-Basha (founder of the consulting firm Basha Report) noted, the Houthis have turned the American drone into the main character of a satirical song called “Bora”—meaning it’s worthless—that mocks the drone’s poor combat capabilities.

The Houthis also sought to bolster domestic political legitimacy and gain regional recognition by attacking U.S. air assets. The downing of U.S. drones boosts the morale of Houthi supporters at a time of heightened tensions under Western and Israeli airstrikes.

From a regional perspective, the claim of destroying the MQ-9s allowed the Houthis to portray themselves as the most lethal member of the Iran-led axis of resistance and win sympathy from anti-US and pro-Palestinian voices in the Arab world.

But the Houthis’ claims deserve skepticism. The rebel group is known for its propaganda operations, including the use of unverifiable statements to inflate perceptions of its military performance. Since the start of the campaign against ships, the Houthis have frequently boasted of successful strikes on U.S. naval assets deployed in the Red Sea, though U.S. Central Command was quick to say such claims were false.

Similarly, the downing of the MQ-9 is a powerful attention-grabbing tool to promote the Houthis’ offensive air warfare capabilities. Whether or not these claims are true, they serve to inflate the Houthis’ supposed combat power and burnish their image as a militia capable of taking on U.S. forces head-on.

Houthis' dangerous partners

Despite the downing of the MQ-9s over Yemen, the negative consequences of these Houthi attacks on US military assets could extend far beyond the country’s borders. After Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, there was a marked acceleration in military cooperation, diplomatic coordination, and symbolic support between the Houthis and Iran (the group’s backer and sponsor), Russia, China, and other regional armed groups in the Tehran-led Axis of Resistance.

Russia has significantly strengthened its political ties with the Houthis, showing diplomatic solidarity with the group’s military operations and providing a counterweight to Washington’s tough stance against them in the UN Security Council.

In addition, US intelligence has revealed that Iran brokered talks between Russia and the Houthis that led to Moscow supplying the group with Russian-made anti-ship cruise missiles, and has reported the presence of Russian military advisers in Yemen, who allegedly provided the Houthis with ship-tracking data and targeting guidance to increase the accuracy of attacks on commercial shipping.

Like Moscow, Beijing appears to have intensified its engagement with the Houthis since mid-November 2023, reportedly striking a deal with the militia to guarantee safe passage for Chinese-flagged commercial vessels. The Houthis are said to have taken advantage of China’s neutral position in the UN Security Council to purchase Chinese-made dual-use military components to bolster their domestic military-industrial base.

While each of these actors is driven by different strategic goals, they share similar deep-rooted anti-Western sentiments, a common denominator that the Houthis have sought to exploit to their advantage.

In this regard, the militant group could present Yemen and the Red Sea as a battleground from which Washington’s adversaries could get their hands on U.S. military equipment. Anti-Western forces could set their sights on U.S.-made technology components for a variety of purposes: They could attempt to reverse engineer components, design custom countermeasures, and obtain potentially sensitive information stored on MQ-9 drones.

For Iran, access to U.S. military hardware has long been a coveted prize. In mid-2019, for example, Iran rushed to recover a U.S. Navy MQ-4C Triton drone that the IRGC had shot down over the Strait of Hormuz. But access to U.S.-made technology could also be useful to others, including China, which faces growing competition in the Indo-Pacific region.

The feasibility of using MQ-9 aircraft

The MQ-9 forms the backbone of the U.S. drone fleet, providing American military planners with tactical depth in Yemen’s rugged interior. However, despite its technical superiority over the Houthi missile force, it has proven vulnerable to basic anti-aircraft weapons systems.

Although the deployment of drones remains a preferred alternative to manned aircraft when operating in a high-risk environment such as Yemen, the rate at which MQ-9 drones have been lost in combat since mid-November 2023 warrants the attention of U.S. military strategists.

With the MQ-9s valued at around $30 million each, the rate of their loss is unsustainable, with one aircraft lost per month during the 15-month campaign of attacks in the Red Sea, according to Houthi claims.

Although the Houthi missile arsenal still poses a low-level threat to U.S. air assets, the group has demonstrated its ability to partially erode U.S. combat superiority, weaken U.S. air superiority, and expose significant weaknesses in the MQ-9’s defense layers.

Washington’s adversaries may seek to exploit these loopholes to advance their strategic interests. After a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas was reached in January, the Houthis pledged to reduce their naval offensive, but safe freedom of navigation is far from being restored in the Red Sea.

Washington should take advantage of the current lull in Houthi attacks to adjust its drone deployment strategy and accelerate the integration of self-protection kits into the MQ-9 that enhance its survivability against hostile fire.

For example, these groups may include active and passive countermeasure systems against cyber, radio frequency or infrared threats.

The United States needs to remain vigilant, and as security conditions in the Red Sea remain volatile, the MQ-9s stand ready to continue to play a critical role in enhancing U.S. awareness of the threat posed by the Houthis.