"The accuracy of Houthi attacks does not exceed 7%".. European Navy Commander calls for the return of cargo ships to the Red Sea

The European Union's naval commander tasked with protecting shipping from Houthi attacks said that at least 15% of ships currently rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope could safely return to the Red Sea with minimal risk.

While Admiral Vassilios Griparis, commander of the EU Naval Forces' Operation Aspides, admits that the three naval vessels he commands are not enough to protect all ships, he says basic risk management measures by some ship owners will be enough to avoid being attacked.

“We can’t protect everyone; we only have three ships,” Griparis told Lloyd’s List in London ahead of meetings with industry leaders and the International Maritime Organization.

“But shipping company CEOs need to do their own risk analysis before they decide to continue diverting all their ships around the Cape of Good Hope, because there are many ships that are not actually included in the threat list,” he explained.

"For those who don't have connections with the Americans, the UK or Israel, there are a huge number of ships that can pass through unharmed. I think another 15% can easily return very safely," he added.

Griparis recommended a combination of turning off the automatic identification systems and passing at night when visual targeting of the Houthis is weak.

Operation Aspides was launched in February when Griparis was given just four days to formulate the operational strategy for an unprecedented EU naval operation that struggled from day one to get the necessary support from governments.

Although Griparis' role is operationally strategic, he finds himself on a constant tour to raise awareness of what Aspidis is doing in order to gain the political support he needs to maintain operational effectiveness.

This operation is not just a European political hurdle. While Aspides ostensibly operates in the same theatre as other Western naval operations, the EU’s naval mandate is purely defensive and aimed at de-escalation.

Griparis acknowledges that the distinction between Aspids and the US- and UK-led attacks that have carried out multiple strikes targeting Houthi facilities over the past year has caused trust issues in regional states, but he says there is now at least an understanding that Aspids is there to defend and assist.

It is also seeking potential support from non-EU actors, and recently met with the Indian Navy to discuss the possibility of offering them support to join as a partner.

“My message to the industry is that they should go back to their home countries and increase the pressure for increased engagement with Aspidis,” Griparis said. At the same time, he believes the most effective mitigation of risk lies in understanding the Houthi threat.

"Fear is the Houthis' most effective weapon," he added, noting that the Houthi attacks are only 7% accurate. He said basic risk mitigation measures could significantly reduce the chances of a ship colliding.

According to Griparis, the shipping industry remains highly vulnerable to Houthi targeting, and the abundance of free, and often inaccurate, data on ship ownership was one area the industry needed to focus on.

“This is the Achilles’ heel of Western civilization, because all these companies leave a very noticeable electronic footprint, and the Houthis have everything they need for free,” Griparis said.

When it comes to physical tracking of ships, Aspidis' advice remains for ships to turn off their automatic identification system at least 70 hours before entering high-risk areas, while also changing course and speed regularly.

According to Aspidis, the Houthis’ targeting and weapons systems have improved dramatically over the past year. However, much of the precision targeting required for guided attack craft and remotely piloted drones still relies on spotters of fishing vessels and line of sight from their remote operators.

According to Aspidis intelligence, night operations for such attacks are extremely difficult without night vision cameras, which the Houthis do not currently possess.

While Griparis insists the results speak for themselves (no ship that turned off its AIS system was successfully targeted, according to EU Navfor ), the majority of ships passing through key danger areas continue to sail with their AIS system turned on.

AIS use is even more widespread. According to Lloyd's List Intelligence , 5% of all transits occurred with AIS switched off in October, compared to 7% in April.

Advice to the industry regarding enabling automatic identification also varies.

The US Maritime Administration and the Joint Maritime Information Center said that broadcasting the Automatic Identification System in or around the Houthi threat area puts ships at greater risk because it helps the Houthis target ships.

Others believe that the Houthis could target ships that do not broadcast AIS, and more importantly, ships that disable their systems would be difficult to locate in the event of an incident.

Ultimately the captain makes the decision whether to transit the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea with or without AIS on.

Source: Lloyd's List, a British website specializing in shipping affairs