Hashemite in Yemen as an equivalent to Alawism in Syria

For ten years, Hashimism has been present in the Yemeni equation as an objective equivalent to Alawism in the Syrian equation, creating all the effective conditions for tearing apart the fabric of society with injustices and division.

The structural changes brought about by the Houthis are re-sorting Yemenis in their regions into Hashemite rulers and non-Hashemite subjects. Not only subjects but also clients through monopolizing money, trade and resources.

It is true that not all Alawites were supporters of the Assad regime, and not all Hashemites in Yemen were followers of the Houthis. But this small number may be held accountable for the sins of many and be wronged twice.

A defensive mechanism is developing that is characterized by violence and counter-extremism, leaving no room for harmony and coexistence in the end. As time passes, the Houthis’ ruthless behavior becomes more entrenched and the defensive mechanism of the anti-Houthi party grows.

A growing rhetorical radicalism among Houthi opponents is a response to Houthi discriminatory behavior in public office, political positions, and the world of finance and business. The situation here may not stop at rhetorical practices on social media.

I fear that the Aqyal movement will atrophy in favor of a more radical and violent movement that could emerge from the womb of these grievances and the absence of a comprehensive political project that restores peace and social harmony and achieves social justice, and the prolongation of instability in the country within the framework of a single dynamic of action and reaction.

The Houthis have surrounded all the Hashemites of Yemen and forcibly cornered them in opposition to the Yemeni project, despite the fact that Hashemite families have a major role in rooting the national project, citizenship, and struggle against the Imamate and building the institutions of modern Yemen.

I do not see what I am saying here as falling within the category of hostility and counter-hostility as a result of the war and its discourse, and not in alignment with the vocal phenomenon of the Aqyal, but as a result of observing your political and economic behavior, which the Houthis are implementing with enthusiasm.

Notice the percentage of Hashemites in the government formation, or the security and military institutions, or the parallel security and military institutions, or notice the judicial and legal corps. Notice the educational institution, especially the university, not only at the presidency level, but also on the councils of colleges and departments.

The equation is getting closer to 80 to 20. There is a job displacement going on at an indifferent rate.

It is better for the Houthi group to learn a lesson from what is happening in Syria and change its approach completely, out of compassion for Yemen and the Yemenis, and out of compassion for the Hashemites themselves, from the vicissitudes of time.

This may be one of the repercussions of the changes in Syria. Creating hope for change through violence and breaking the idol of the regime, even if after a while. Hope is generated for salvation from tyranny, whatever the results. And hope only comes from groups that are ideologically and religiously opposed, not from within the regime that has lost the ability to reform, improve, and change its discriminatory nature.

Experience has shown that minority ruling groups drown in their racism and violence and surround themselves with a pool of blood that never dries up. They drag most of their constituents with them because they live under constant coercive threat. Fear is their tool and their DNA. The price of changing or overthrowing them is great, long-term, and full of suffering that is difficult to repair. Is there anyone who will take heed?!

(From the author's page)