Houthi group confronts new leadership in Syria

The emergence of the new Syrian leadership after its control of Damascus has provoked mixed reactions, which can be classified into three types: those who support it, those who are wary, and those who reject it. The latter type has begun to develop an offensive strategy over the past few days, with the aim of detracting from what happened, not only by downplaying the importance of the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the control of the capital, Damascus, but also by inciting a counter-revolution and emptying what is happening of any moral or political value.

These responses may seem expected, especially if they come from countries surrounding Syria or parties directly linked to the conflict that began in 2011 in light of the regional division between two conflicting axes.

But what draws attention are the reactions of the Houthi group in Yemen. Since day one, they have worked to distort what happened, diminish it, and direct the action according to the scale of the conflict with Israel. This happened in more than one media form and at more than one level within the voices of the Houthi group, from the group’s leader to the smallest person or account holder on the X or Facebook platform.

There are those who offer advice on managing the stage and - ironically - demand following the Houthi model, and there are those who highlight - rightly or wrongly - sectarian violations against Alawites, Shiite groups or minorities. Some of them see the matter as a conspiracy, to the point of considering what happened as a continuation of what they call Israeli hegemony.

So why were the Houthis' reactions like this?

In our opinion, there are three reasons that explain this position: the sectarian nature of the group, the centrality of the sectarian dimension in its perceptions, and thirdly, media and symbolic considerations.

We will explain these reasons.

First: The Houthi group belongs to the Iranian axis, which is sectarian in essence, and therefore sees the loss of any geographical or strategic spot from this axis as a comprehensive setback. This pushes all parties of the axis to “collapse” with “vigilance and fever” to confront the losses. The situation of the Houthis nominates them to be the first to collapse.

Second: In comparison with the first, based on sectarian considerations - as a primary driver for the existence of the Houthi group - the Houthi group views the transformations in Syria from a purely sectarian perspective, far from the angle of freedom and oppression, or the end of the division of Syria, or within the process of the Arab state for nearly a century. Therefore, the Houthi group at this stage claims to defend the Alawite and Shiite sects in Syria and limits what happened to being an Umayyad victory to reaffirm the historical sectarian nature of the conflict taking place in the Arab countries. Here, dualities appear in the discourse of the group’s followers: Umayyad versus Prophetic, or Umayyad versus Husseini.

Third: The media image had placed the Houthis at an advanced level of international interest for more than a year, in addition to and thanks to the war in Gaza. The transformations in Syria have overthrown this image and returned the Houthis to a normal position. Here, the Houthi group is active - in the media and perhaps later on the ground if events in Syria develop into fighting and the emergence of hotbeds of civil war - to challenge the new Syrian leadership and highlight its flaws and belittle it, considering it a mere tool for implementing Israel's strategy, or to criticize it for not confronting the Israeli expansion at this stage. This is in the hope of seizing the lead from it or sharing it, when it presents itself as the opposite, especially after the absence of Hezbollah and its leader, who, if he were alive, would not have missed giving a speech every day in this regard.

Thus, by the Houthi group seeking to fill the void and trying to confront the new Syrian leadership, it is putting itself head-to-head to insert its image into the big media billboard. Moreover, what the Houthi group is doing regarding the Syrian issue is inseparable from Iranian behavior.

What is surprising, however, is the Houthi group’s exaggeration in its annoyance at the loss of Bashar’s regime, even though he was not an essential partner for the group and did not provide it with services and assistance like Hezbollah did. Given the Houthi group’s ties in Yemen to the Syrian regime, which did not even grant it diplomatic recognition, the demise of Bashar’s regime was actually a loss for Iran, not the Houthis.

The essential point in toppling the regime in Syria was to reveal the extent and magnitude of the violations that affected the Syrian people. Accordingly, what happened in Damascus naturally leads to making reasonable comparisons with and towards more than one party. One of the aspects of these logical comparisons with the Bashar al-Assad regime is the comparison with the behavior of another arm of the Iranian axis, which is the Houthi group.

The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime helped Yemenis revive their collective memory of the abuses they suffered under the Houthis. These abuses included killings, arrests, prisons, and the sectarian nature of power, as well as discriminatory policies and dynastic legislation that tore society apart and perpetuated terror and intelligence practices.

Merely comparing the practices of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the Houthi group is enough to instill fear in the souls of the Houthis, whose violations are widely documented.

Finally, the demise of Bashar’s regime brings renewed hope for the possibility of getting rid of similar sectarian regimes, which heralds the end of the sectarian equations weighing on many Arab peoples. This change may be reflected practically in Yemen as well, where an opportunity may emerge to turn the page on sectarian behavior, which is one of the most prominent concerns that troubles the Houthi group.

(From the author's page)