Why did the Syrian opposition succeed in expelling Assad's army from several provinces in 7 days?

Seven days have passed since the launch of the military operation "Deterrence of Aggression", which was announced by the Syrian opposition factions against the areas controlled by the Syrian regime army, but its rapid results, the area of land it controlled, and the accompanying collapse of the forces allied with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, all constituted a surprise on more than one level.

On the military side, the flight of many Syrian army forces in the face of the opposition’s advance, even without fighting, raises questions about the readiness of these forces and their actual capabilities on the ground. The absence of the usual air support from Russia (Assad’s ally) is also an issue that needs to be answered.

On the international side, the opposition attack came at a very delicate regional time, following the ceasefire in Lebanon, the continuation of the Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip, and after numerous strikes by Iranian forces and Hezbollah in Syria by Israel.

What happened?

The first questions that arose as events accelerated were about what had happened, the preparations that preceded it, and how it had begun.

Researcher at the Jusoor Center for Studies, Wael Alwan, says that after more than 5 months of preparation and planning, the armed opposition factions in Idlib launched extensive battles against the regime forces, and perhaps no one imagined - even the factions themselves - that these battles would be this extensive due to the major collapses that occurred within the ranks of the regime.

Alwan added - in an interview with Al Jazeera Net - that on November 27, opposition factions met and formed a command room for operations, and named this battle "Operation Deterrence of Aggression." He confirmed that the operations began in the western countryside of Aleppo, and then dozens of villages fell on the first day.

The political researcher pointed out that the first defensive line did not affect the morale of the regime forces as it did on the second day when the front and rear defensive lines began to collapse, with the supply routes cut off, and videos and pictures of the regime forces fleeing began to spread.

Causes of collapse

Talking about the reasons for the withdrawal of many regime forces from their bases may be complex, and may be due to reasons related to the Syrian army itself, or related to the capabilities of the opposition and its readiness for this battle, or the regional circumstances that the region is going through.

In an interview with Al Jazeera Net, military and strategic expert Hatem Al Falahi summed up these reasons as follows:

• First: The Syrian interior was largely prepared to go out or revolt against the Syrian regime due to the poor economic conditions and the result of the security practices in these areas of Syria.
• Second: Russian and Iranian support for the Syrian regime has declined significantly due to recent events and developments in the region.
• Third: The last point related to developments in the region also cast its shadow as a result of the withdrawal of many Hezbollah fighters from the Syrian front towards Lebanon due to the battles between the party and Israel, which led to a great deal of confusion in the Syrian defenses.
• Fourth: The opposition forces are rushing to gain the largest area of land in the shortest possible time, so as not to give the regime forces a chance to restore balance, send reinforcements, or catch their breath in this region.
• Fifth: In the period preceding the military action in Operation “Deterrence of Aggression,” there were infiltration operations by the opposition into areas controlled by the regime forces, and field leaders working within the Syrian regime army and the forces supporting it were assassinated.

Opposition strength and goals

It is natural for analysts to say that the gains achieved by the opposition in just 7 days indicate good planning and preparation by the operations room formed by the opposition for this battle, but the researcher at the Jusoor Center adds other dimensions:

• First: Russian air cover was not present in the first days of the battle to provide support to the forces loyal to the Syrian regime, as well as the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the Lebanese Hezbollah, and the various Iraqi factions, which caused them to receive strong and severe blows, and suffered from a structural and organizational defect, and they also appeared exhausted and suffering from a bad psychological and moral state.
• Second: The logistical support left by the Syrian regime and the auxiliary forces on the battlefield and the bases they fled from, such as ammunition depots, anti-tank missiles, the capture of Iranian drones, and a large number of armored vehicles and tanks, which constitutes more than double what the factions had allocated as a basis for entering this battle.

As for Al-Falahi, he believes that determining the goal of this battle was important in its progress and acceleration, and he says that the military operation was directed at striking Iranian influence in the region, especially in the Aleppo area, considering that Iran was saying that the first line of defense for Iranian national security is the city of Aleppo, and the second line of defense is Mosul.

He added that the policy followed by the opposition was an important aspect of its safe progress, as no cases of violations against civilians were recorded in the areas they seized, in addition to protecting the government departments located there.

International Dimensions

When looking at the “deterrence of aggression” operations from the perspective of international politics, the Syrian president’s international and regional relations will be the point at which all international policies meet in the Syrian geography.

Turkey, for example, supports the opposition factions, and their interests are shared in more than one aspect. There is Turkish discontent with the Syrian regime’s failure to commit to returning to the Sochi Agreement in 2019, according to Alwan.

The researcher at the Jusoor Center added that Turkey did not want to take any action before the ceasefire was announced in Lebanon, because it did not want it to be said that Turkey had gone towards something that was in Israel's interest, or that it was against the interests of Israel's enemies.

He continued to stress that these battles revealed the extent of the Syrian army's ability to survive without air cover from Russia, or without the support that was provided to it by Iran, Hezbollah, or the Iraqi factions.

As for the military and strategic analyst, he believes that what is happening now is a quasi-Turkish-Russian agreement, as Turkey has been pressing during the past period to reach an agreement with the Syrian regime, but it refused. Therefore, Russia wanted to prove to Iran and the regime that they must bear responsibility for decisions that could be painful.

Wael Alwan concludes by saying that there are very big equations at the regional level that are not limited to Syria alone, or to Palestine or Lebanon, as the entire region is going to change, and this means that the map will not return to what it was before the battle of “deterring aggression” began.

Source: Al Jazeera