America and the strategy of punishing the Houthis

On the other hand, the US administration launched a series of raids targeting the capital, Sana'a, on March 15, after President Trump announced the use of overwhelming force against the Houthis by launching a military operation to obstruct shipping. The raids resulted in the deaths of nine civilians in Sana'a, in addition to the US administration expanding its sanctions against the group, targeting first-class political leaders, in addition to relying on the maximum sanctions policy against Iran and its consequences for the group.

Also, capitalizing on the military transformations resulting from the reduction of Iran's proxies in the region, which have shifted the balance of power in favor of its opponents, including reasserting the sovereignty of local authorities, may lead to the group's suffocation, or at least multiplying the challenges it faces as a de facto authority.

The US-led policy of besieging and weakening the Houthi group requires two levels of intervention. First, the regional level. According to the logic that curbing Iranian support for its proxies stems from a policy of maximum sanctions against it, this policy weakens its proxies. The US administration's focus on the Iranian oil sector, in addition to being a means of pressure to resume negotiations on its nuclear program (albeit on US terms), deepens the economic crisis within Iran. This forces the government to devote its resources to addressing the living challenges facing its citizens, thereby reducing the economic resources it deducts to fund its proxies, including the Houthi group. Furthermore, targeting the oil sector with periodic sanctions narrows informal trade channels between Iran and the group, thus depriving it of easy revenues from the smuggling and sale of oil and gas.

On the other hand, the long-term policy of normalizing US-Russian relations not only aims to create political and security alliances among international powers to manage the Russian war in Ukraine, but also aims to dismantle the Russian-Iranian alliance, or at least reduce the level of trade and military exchanges that benefit Iran's proxies, such as the Houthi group.

On the other hand, through its policy of pressuring Iran, whether through military threats or diplomacy, including managing the nuclear issue, the US administration aims, in addition to restricting Iran's nuclear capabilities, to pressure it on other important security and political issues, such as halting support for its proxies, whether in Iraq or Yemen.

On another level, the US administration aims, through its announced military operation, to target the group's military infrastructure, after reclassifying it as a terrorist organization. This means criminalizing it politically, making it equal in terms of prohibition and punishment to jihadist Islamic groups. This would then criminalize any international or local forces that engage diplomatically with it, thereby enforcing a policy of political isolation.

Militarily, while the trajectories of the airstrikes and the US administration's ability to deliver a decisive blow to the Houthis remain unclear, the US administration is simultaneously counting on the policy of maximum sanctions on Iran to impact the group's economic stability, thereby generating economic challenges, including limiting the possibility of developing its military capabilities.

While targeted economic sanctions, whether by designating the group as a terrorist organization or banning oil imports through the port of Hodeidah, aim to harm its local economy, economic sanctions provide the US administration with a degree of flexibility that exempts it from the risks of military intervention in Yemen, in exchange for continuing to besiege and weaken the group without incurring financial losses.

On the other hand, although the strikes on Iran's proxies have led to an improvement in the conditions of local forces, which the US administration has exploited to consolidate state hegemony and limit Hezbollah in Lebanon, or to pressure the Iraqi government to dissolve the Shiite militias loyal to Iran, the shifts in the influence of Iran's proxies have not led to a change in the local equation in Yemen. Therefore, it is difficult to bet, at the present time, that these facts will contribute to improving the conditions of the group's opponents militarily, other than pushing the war in Yemen towards a path of comprehensive escalation.

While the US administration is hesitant to intervene militarily to eliminate the group, and may currently be limited to airstrikes, it may be banking on the political and economic consequences of designating it a terrorist organization and continuing to target its funding networks.

As for the Houthi group, its alliance with Iran, while harmed by US punitive policies, has been careful to reduce the level of this connection, at least politically, by focusing its role as a support force for the Islamic resistance in Gaza. This means it will continue to be a force that threatens Israel and, consequently, confronts US policy in the region.

While the group's cautious approach toward the United States was previously dictated by regional circumstances, namely the confusion facing Iran and, more importantly, the decreasing levels of tension between Israel and Hamas during the first phase of the hostage exchange deal, the group committed to a de-escalation in exchange for a reduction in the repercussions of its reclassification as a terrorist organization.

Recent tensions, both domestically, represented by the US punitive policy against the group, and regionally, have pushed the group to move beyond its cautious policy. In addition to the US sanctions that have targeted the group's top leadership, from the official spokesman to the head of the Political Council and other prominent leaders, which means removing the political cover from the entire group's power pyramid, the fragile truce in Gaza, Israel's suspension of the second phase of the truce agreement, and its halting of the flow of humanitarian aid to the Gaza Strip to pressure Hamas, have pushed the group to re-activate the Red Sea navigation card in the context of confronting Israeli, and subsequently US, influence in the region.

Under the pretext of lifting the humanitarian blockade on Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, the group announced (in mid-March) a ban on Israeli ships passing through the Red Sea. While it is not yet possible to predict the repercussions of this measure on shipping traffic, and the directions the US administration might take in responding to the group's threats, it largely reflects the group's fears of dragging the conflict into a confrontation that would reap its losses.

Ultimately, escalating hostility against America and Israel, while weakening Iran and its network of proxies, is a costly battle for the Houthi group. More importantly, confronting the military deterrence policy that the Trump administration may implement, along with the weapon of sanctions with their political and economic consequences, is crucial. Beyond the consequences of the military operation in Yemen and its intensification against the Houthi group, reclassifying it as a terrorist organization means improving the position of its local opponents, at least politically, while increasing its isolation. It will also push it to adopt a radical, hardline policy whose consequences will affect citizens in the areas under its control.

On the other hand, designating the group as a "terrorist" group eliminates the chances of resuming negotiations between the Yemeni parties and thus ending the war. However, the group, like its opponents, does not seek to end the war, as Yemen's continued security threat means the Yemeni parties' conditions of power remain in place.

Third, the economic repercussions of the group's terrorist designation remain its greatest challenge. In addition to the consequences of the continued targeting of its funding networks, the designation of the group as a terrorist organization, the increased economic sanctions, and the ban on the import of petroleum products from the city of Hodeidah place the group's economy at risk.

Add to this the sanctions imposed by the previous US administration on a number of commercial banks in the capital, Sana'a, and you'll find the economic challenges the group will face are dire. This is in addition to the economic policies that its local opponents may resort to in order to enforce its designation as a terrorist organization. This could push the financial and banking division and economic war in Yemen forward. Of course, regardless of the implications of terrorism and its motives among the forces of global tyranny, as well as the group's investments and the steps it may take to circumvent the sanctions, the economic punishment will have disastrous consequences for the already impoverished Yemenis.

*Quoted from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed