What options do allies have in Yemen?

The repercussions of the ongoing US military operation in Yemen, both in terms of its political significance and its military dimensions, are affecting the balance of power between Yemeni factions on the ground, and consequently its impact on the map of the local conflict. Although it is too early to predict this, what is more important is the impact of US deterrence mechanisms against the Houthi group on the choices of regional actors in Yemen, both in the context of the challenges they create and the gains they generate.

Yemen, a country where multiple proxies are active, has been subjected to the strategy of their allies in managing their influence. Beyond the root of the local conflict and the influence of proxies, with varying conditions of power and also their relationship with their allies, which allows or restricts the scope of effectiveness and influence, regional actors have confiscated the proxies' decision, resulting in linking the Yemeni issue to the political agendas of those actors, thus transforming Yemen into a multipolar area of regional influence.

Alongside Saudi Arabia, which manages proxies within a consensus authority, Iran, an ally of the Houthi group, constitutes the second pillar of the equation of influence in Yemen. In addition, the UAE dominates key proxies within the consensus authority system. While the Saudi-Iranian conflict has governed the course of the war, in contrast to the Saudi-Emirati rivalry in southern Yemen, the relationship with the United States has constituted another level that regulates (or escalates) tensions between the actors and their proxies.

On the other hand, the US escalation may increase the level of risks threatening Saudi Arabia, including turning it into a potential target for the group. The US escalation in Yemen may also impact Saudi diplomacy in the region, and consequently, its political and economic interests.

In contrast, the US escalation in Yemen poses other challenges regarding the group's deterrence mechanism and the extent of Saudi Arabia's involvement. In addition to Yemen's geographical proximity, which means any military escalation there would create security threats on its borders, Saudi Arabia's possession of local proxies in Yemen could make it vulnerable to US pressure to adopt an active role in deterring the group.

The ongoing maritime crisis also forces Saudi Arabia, a country bordering the Red Sea, to engage with the US policy of limiting the group's threats, thereby introducing new levels of challenges and risks. This is in addition to the effectiveness of the US deterrence policy against the group in securing Saudi interests and protecting it from the group's threats.

In response to current regional tensions, Saudi Arabia has adopted a cautious policy toward US escalation, both against Iran and the Houthi group. On the one hand, after more than two weeks of US military operations, Saudi Arabia has distanced itself from the objectives and consequences of the operations, seeking to avoid any hostile actions from the group. However, US raids on the city of Saada, near the Saudi border, have raised the threat level within its borders, including the continued paralysis of shipping in the Red Sea.

However, the resumption of the Israeli war in the Gaza Strip does not only give the Houthi group a basis for continuing its attacks, whether against Israel (and subsequently against America), but it also undermines the Saudi diplomacy that it followed in formulating an Arab position regarding the future of the Gaza Strip, in a way that intersects with the American and Israeli vision of limiting the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), and consequently with its allies in the region. Therefore, the Israeli escalation in Gaza, and also the American escalation against the Houthi group, eliminates the possibility of achieving stability in the region, and more importantly, it doubles the strength of the resistance forces, including the Houthi group.

On the other hand, while the US and Saudi strategies overlap in disrupting the influence of Iran and its allies in the region, Saudi Arabia's lack of military and defensive capabilities, whether to achieve a military balance with Iran or to protect its interests from threats from its proxy in Yemen, makes Saudi Arabia the losing party in the US deterrence strategy, and thus the US operation against the group.

At this time, a real and perhaps unprecedented challenge looms regarding Saudi diplomacy in managing the Yemeni issue, whether in terms of the future of the US military operation against the group, the levels of Saudi involvement, both militarily and politically, in supporting it, or the consequences of US economic sanctions against the group, and Saudi Arabia's role in imposing the economic blockade.

Saudi Arabia may therefore resort to a choice that balances its security considerations and its relationship with its American ally, by giving its agents in Yemen the option of confronting the group. However, the decisive factor here is the future of American pressure on Saudi Arabia regarding the Yemeni issue, and, of course, the means to eliminate the group.

It provides America, and also Israel, with military and political cover to change the security equation in the Yemeni islands and waterways, to contain the group’s threats, in addition to the control of its agents over the Yemeni coasts and waterways, albeit nominally. In addition to the presence of its agents in the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the control of its agents over the areas adjacent to the group’s authority in the city of Hodeidah, which constitutes the cornerstone of the American deterrence policy, including securing navigation in the Red Sea, gives the UAE an advanced position over other allies to wage the battle of support and backup, of course, according to the American light on its allies and the outcomes of the military operation against the group.

*Quoted from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed