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Yasin Al Tamimi
Calling the Tools in the Saudi-Emirati War of Influence in Yemen
Opinions| 22 September, 2024 - 2:21 PM
Never has a war in which a large military alliance such as the Saudi-led coalition intervened ended with the same outcome as the war of this alliance in Yemen, where political and strategic gains have accumulated for the target of that war, the Houthi group allied with Iran, in a way that does not agree with the military facts that have greatly reduced the group’s geographical influence.
A few days ago, the UAE, the second main country in the coalition to support legitimacy, gathered two political and military parties affiliated with it in Abu Dhabi, and set two common goals for this meeting: fighting the Houthis and combating terrorist groups. However, the matter is nothing more than part of a plan to summon tools and move them on the lines of contact in the regional war of influence that is taking place specifically between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and both countries are keen to add more advantages that enhance their chances of building a closer alliance with Washington.
I say this because neither of these goals is realistic. The Houthis are no longer a military target for Saudi Arabia, which is the leader of the coalition and has a fundamental role in setting the political and military agenda of the coalition or the unilateral intervention of both countries in the Yemeni arena. The UAE’s allies cannot wage a war outside the Saudi agenda.
At the same time, there is no longer any justification for continuing to talk about terrorist groups whose influence has disappeared and vanished, in the midst of the war that has been going on over the past nine years with political and geopolitical goals that are not hidden from anyone with insight, while some remain keen to include “terrorism” in the war line in order to cover up its roles, which, to say the least, are establishing a sustainable phase of “terrorism” by sub-state groups linked to regional agendas.
But why did the two members of the Presidential Leadership Council, Brigadier General Tariq Saleh and Major General Aidarous al-Zubaidi, who are leaders of two political and military factions supported by the UAE (the Political Bureau of the National Resistance and the Southern Transitional Council), meet? What messages can be understood from this meeting? It is worth noting that ambiguity prevails in the Emirati and Saudi movements in the Yemeni arena, and what is revealed about these movements is only a small part of what leaks through Yemenis close to these two countries, and in my opinion this is due to the deliberate disdain that these two countries direct at the Yemeni people.
To understand the significance of the Abu Dhabi meeting, we must look closely at the developments taking place in Hadhramaut Governorate. In this governorate, the tribal role is being called into the political arena, through rough practices that resort to escalation, roadblocks, and the imposition of unfair conditions on the legitimate authority, represented by the Presidential Leadership Council and its chairman in particular.
These movements ostensibly use arguments such as the poor basic services Hadhramaut suffers from, but more importantly, they raise political slogans related to imposing the “Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance” and its political front, the “Hadhramaut Comprehensive Conference” as the legitimate representative of the governorate, which is something that deducts from the political share of the Transitional Council, and deals a fatal blow to the council, which was given an opportunity in 2019 by the UAE to appear as a military and political force that is actually capable of filling the void in this sprawling, oil-producing governorate.
The Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance and its comprehensive conference have always been a joint Saudi-Emirati political investment, but Saudi Arabia is working, through many options, including the “Hadhramaut National Council,” to narrow the options for the southern separatist project, of which the Transitional Council is the main lever, and behind it the UAE.
The two countries will not tolerate a tense relationship with Yemen, which has the largest population in the Arabian Peninsula, even if it is burdened by conflicts and wars at this stage.
(Arabic 21)
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