To the Yemeni government: Before termites eat it away

This can actually be remedied by making the legitimate government a true expression of the general will of the Yemenis, who want to restore their state, return to their political path, and build a modern Yemen.

Therefore, the current legitimacy should be rational and legal, as long as we are in a state of fragmentation of decision. Insight dictates that it is not possible to decide on the division of the country, nor on determining the fate of a party or geographical area, nor on distributing wealth unless the capital of the Yemenis is restored, so that it is possible to go legally and consensually to study such a matter.

All parties realize that no matter how correct and just their demands are, they need legitimacy. Their involvement in the government does not mean obstruction or disengagement. Because the current government derives its legitimacy from a mandate to manage or achieve a temporary goal, not from deciding on the origins of legitimacy.

We have to take ten years into consideration, which began with President Hadi leaving Aden, stripped of all power except his suit, on an unknown path, after Yemen became at the mercy of the wind and under the control of the Saleh-Houthi alliance in early 2015 after this alliance took control of Sanaa in the summer of 2014, with the complete collapse of the military and security establishment outside this alliance.

The matter developed and events followed one another with the rise of the first waves of popular resistance in Aden, Taiz and Marib, then the building and formation of combat units, leading to the restructuring of the political leadership and the gathering of the major military and political forces into a leadership entity that was unable to stand on its feet without trembling.

Anyone following the events realizes that the Houthis, by their adventurous nature and indifferent to the fate of the people, do not fear any regional or international parties as much as they fear the totality of the legitimate forces. Therefore, they blackmail the countries of the region with bombing and targeting, and pressure the international community by polluting the Red Sea or piracy on ships, and disrupting the international navigation route. This is as long as these forces are not enthusiastic about fighting him, and because they have projects, programs and wealth to fear.

Al Houthi refuses to deal with the legitimate government, not because it does not exist or is marginal, but because dealing with regional and international powers is less costly for him than confronting legitimacy militarily and on the ground.

The Yemeni government, with its reasons for resistance, motives for rejection, belief in steadfastness and legitimacy to survive, poses an existential threat to the Houthi project. The Houthi group realizes that it can reach an urgent deal, even if it is not complete, with the entire world except with the Yemenis. Therefore, it is doing everything in its power to avoid them.

True, the "legitimacy" kept the name of Yemen as a state on the political map, and succeeded in maintaining international cooperation that contributed to relieving people from the specter of hunger, and implementing vital projects in several regions. We are still a state with an airport and a few planes transporting Yemenis, and an authority that issues passports, birth certificates, and educational diplomas.

But the country is not doing well, and it is a lie to extol these victories while the country’s sovereignty is being violated, and the law is barely enforced. The country’s flag is barely raised in its capital, and the head of state can barely receive his delegations, while the Yemeni is scattered all over the world, a quarter of the population is displaced, and two-thirds of the people are in dire need of aid.

The Houthi presence and control over the capital Sana'a, their interference in regional conflicts, their exposure of Yemen to bombardment, and the bringing of parties such as Israel and others into the scene, represent the greatest insult to the collective conscience of Yemen. What is happening is not seen as merely actions that affect Yemen's sovereignty, but rather expresses a painful decline in Yemen's historical and political status, and places the Yemeni government before a continuous challenge to restore the dignity and independence of this country and rebuild the state of Yemenis.

Some time ago, I met a distinguished European researcher who is experienced in dealing with Arab issues and has contacts with Yemeni parties, including the Houthi group. He asked me: Where is the legitimate government in reality and on the ground? And what is the extent of its influence and presence? His question was loaded with sarcasm to the point of denial. This question prompted me to think deeply about the status of the “legitimate government” and to search for an answer that would satisfy me personally before I answered him.

Yemeni legitimacy is, in essence, the product of Yemeni political, partisan and cultural diversity and plurality. It is a collection of conflicting political projects that reflect the political impasse in Yemen since the achievement of unity. However, at the present moment, it is the only party with which the international community can deal and enter into agreements and understandings.

As for the Yemenis, however disappointing this legitimacy is, it remains their last protector from the vicissitudes of time and the fluctuations of the situation in the region. It is the last official document bearing the emblem of the republic and its bird, and it guarantees their minimum basic rights to movement, travel, work, living and education, whether inside or outside the country.

In short, the risks are high, and the interaction with them is much less than required. I will not go into many details so as not to get lost, but I would like to stop at some important symptoms:

First: Transforming Aden into a real capital

The current challenges cannot be met nor can the Yemeni state be restored from the grip of Iranian influence unless Aden becomes a capital in its full and true sense for all Yemenis. Aden must embrace the central state apparatus, absorb business leaders from all over Yemen, and become the center of national decision-making, from which the spirit of the inclusive Yemeni state emanates.

Second: The political and media elite is out of touch with reality

The presence of most of the Yemeni political and media elite outside the country, their comfortable movement between Arab and international capitals, and their acceptance of international organizations’ programs far from Yemen’s political and economic priorities and the narrative of the conflict and its course, made them disconnected from the Yemeni reality. In their new and safe diaspora and in the midst of a great vacuum, these elites drowned in their momentary conflicts, reshaped themselves with the emergence of conflicting wings, and fell to the bottom of preoccupation with trivialities instead of focusing on crucial issues.

Third: Weak party performance and the risks of totalitarianism

The parties’ greed to maximize their share of government jobs and abandon their fundamental role in creating a partisan and political environment that expresses the will of the people, is connected to their issues, and derives its legitimacy and decision-making center from them, has marginalized their actual role as a national lever. The parties have left the vacuum for armed groups, or have rebelled willingly, or have turned into tribes through ideology or crude regional expression. Armed groups do not respect rights and freedoms. This threatens to establish totalitarianism at the expense of democracy and pluralism.

Fourth: Deviation of political priorities

The political awareness within the legitimacy has deviated from its first and last duty, which is to restore Sana’a and liberate the necks of the Yemenis from the dominance of the Houthi group and the Iranian influence supporting it. The vocabulary of this goal is absent in the political discourse, and the media, political and educational preparations to achieve it are absent.

For example, the Houthi radio broadcasts its speeches to all of Yemen, even to the areas bordering Saada inside Saudi territory, where people listen to Abdul Malik’s boring and hollow words. While the local authority in Taiz is unable to address half of the Taiz population under Houthi control with a single radio, television or educational channel. I fear that this epidemic will spread to the military units.

Fifth: The problem of dealing with regional conflicts

The regional struggle for influence in Yemen cannot be addressed by reinforcing separatist tendencies with more division. Rather, the focus must be on developing a comprehensive national vision that unifies efforts against the common enemy. Surrendering to the logic of dividing the divided will not create a government capable of defending the interests of Yemen and the Yemenis.

Sixth: Failure to control vital sectors

There is no point in waging a war in the name of the Yemenis against the Houthis without controlling vital sectors such as communications, the internet, and international transportation. The irony is that the internet in the areas controlled by the Houthis is more efficient and under their control, while the internet in Aden does not even cover the city itself.

In the face of these challenges, I propose one proposal as an entry point to address the situation and remedy the matter. Its essence is: the executive authority, at its central and provincial levels, must be liberated from the quota system. In this context, two main options appear before us:

• Restructuring the Presidential Leadership Council, so that it is restored to the effectiveness of decision-making and decision-making in a practical and decisive manner.
• Or restructuring the government, so that it is composed of highly qualified male and female employees, away from the quota system and sharing of ministerial portfolios.

These steps will be the basis for improving executive performance and enhancing effectiveness in addressing the security and political challenges facing the country, the ability to recover resources, and achieving mobilization consistent with the challenges.

If legitimacy seeks to be legitimate and wishes to escape being eaten away by termites, it must have a collective awareness that rearranges priorities and mobilizes energies toward a comprehensive national goal that transcends all marginal conflicts and divisions.

(Author's Page)