"The crowding of projects has thwarted it." This is the Islah Party's vision for activating the Presidential Leadership Council and improving its performance

He considered this a problem that affected the performance of the council, explaining that any political project will not succeed unless the Houthi militia coup is overthrown and the state is restored.

He continued, "No political force can succeed in the presence of a terrorist group that controls an important part of the country, has excess power, and has tried to take advantage of regional issues such as the Gaza issue, to increase its war on the Yemenis."

He added: "Any political entity that believes that it can achieve its goal while it is present is mistaken, because it will eliminate everyone, whether those who believe in a federal Yemen or those who believe in another project, as long as this group is sitting on the chests of the Yemenis," noting that it seems that this matter has not been taken into consideration by the Presidential Leadership Council.

The member of the Supreme Reform Commission and head of the parliamentary bloc said that the failure to prepare Aden to be the capital of the Yemeni state, to which all institutions return, is one of the reasons for the weakness of the Presidential Leadership Council, noting that there are objective and subjective obstacles.

He considered that the failure to complete some provisions of the 2019 Riyadh Agreement related to its security and military preparation, and the lack of seriousness and desire among individuals and institutions to return to Aden and settle there, are among the reasons that weakened the performance of the Presidential Council.

#Al-Hijri lists the reasons for the weak performance of the Presidential Leadership Council. #Al-Islah_Net pic.twitter.com/yg0JhLGXUn

— Islah Net 🇾🇪 (@Islahyem) February 17, 2025

He pointed out that the government is more present than others in terms of presence on the ground, while the Presidential Council is semi-mobile, while the House of Representatives was not allowed to return to exercise its role from within Yemen, neither in Aden nor elsewhere.

He said that the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission made a better effort than others in attending and produced three documents, which were hindered by comments that were not completed, explaining that one of the reasons that weakened the Leadership Council was that it did not approve the regulations organizing its work, which are the decisive factor in controlling the path, even though the decision to transfer power specified 45 days to complete it.

Al-Hajri stressed in his intervention that in order to assess the extent of the Presidential Leadership Council’s success in its tasks, it is necessary to return to the decision to transfer power and examine the tasks assigned to the Council, explaining that a large number of these tasks have not been implemented.

He explained that the Council's mission is to work to restore the state and its institutions, peacefully or by war, from the terrorist Houthi militia, expressing his regret that this did not happen in a satisfactory manner.

He pointed to positive aspects of the Presidential Leadership Council, as military confrontations stopped in some governorates, and confrontations became in institutions, discussions, opinions and projects.

The member of the Supreme Reform Commission and head of the parliamentary bloc confirmed that one of the issues that caused the ineffectiveness of the Presidential Leadership Council was the failure to unify the military forces that follow members of the Leadership Council.

He continued: "Today, we have become humble. We do not demand their integration, but rather the unification of their military decision, and the creation of an operations room that controls the performance of these numerous armed forces, to be a factor of strength for the council, and impose their presence, while their remaining in this dispersed form becomes a problem for the council and not a factor of success."

He stressed the need to unify the military decision, under the management of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Interior, noting that the operations body that was created does not rise to the level of the required operations room.

Al-Hijri denied that Islah had any privilege before transferring power to the Presidential Leadership Council, adding: “From the national perspective of the Yemeni Islah Congregation, as a political force, it sees the performance of the Presidential Leadership Council as disappointing, and not what the Yemenis were aspiring to.”

He said that the problem that hindered the country was that instead of moving towards projects that would advance Yemen, they turned to quotas, and each party wanted to fill the void with its members.

Al-Hajri pointed out that Islah conveyed its point of view to the Presidential Leadership Council, collectively and individually, that the performance is unsatisfactory, and that it must be improved for the benefit of the entire country, because without the return of Yemen and the authority of the state to manage the country in general, Islah and other political forces will not benefit, stressing that Yemen is greater than all these parties.