Yemen.. Crisis Bloc

The effectiveness of political blocs, including their continuity, is based on the ability of the allied forces to unify their internal policies to achieve a common political goal, which requires, first, bridging the gap between the allied parties and finding a conciliatory ground, whether at the level of the components or their popular bases, in addition to representing the interests of citizens and possessing the political decision, and far from the slogans that force the name “national” into conflictual alignments that do not meet the need of the Yemenis to stop the war, nor achieve their interests, but rather feed future cycles of conflict.

The bloc of parties did not arise from mutual understandings produced by in-depth approaches to the Yemeni situation and the development of solutions to get out of the crisis, whether in its political or economic aspects, but rather in response to the will of international and regional actors, which are moving (as it seems) towards crystallizing political alignments aimed at changing the political equation in opposition to the Houthi group.

On the other hand, usurping the decision of the political bloc’s forces in favor of their allies makes them subject to their will and dependent on them. If Saudi Arabia (the main and dominant party in the camp of the group’s opponents) has continued, over the years, to adopt a strategy of forming political blocs to support the legitimate authority, even if it failed to achieve this due to the clash of its priorities with those of its regional competitor, the UAE, then the formation of the Presidential Council, a consensus authority (including its agents and the agents of the UAE), did not strengthen its support on the ground.

In addition to the Popular Congress Party, the Political Bureau of the National Resistance (Brigadier General Tariq Mohammed Saleh’s wing) and marginal entities loyal to the Congress, such as the Solidarity Party, were present. While this is important, it does not mean that the wings of the Congress Party can be unified at the level of political discourse and orientation, due to the competition between its wings and the multiplicity of its political umbrellas, as well as the multiplicity of its loyalties between forces that bet on their relationship with Saudi Arabia, and other (more effective) forces that are subject to the policy of their Emirati ally.

In contrast, the Islah Party is attending with a representative presence similar to the conference, but the test is not the inclusion of the two opponents in the bloc, but rather their ability to overcome their differences and strengthen political alignment in the camp of the Houthi group’s opponents. If the interests of the forces included in the bloc constitute a fundamental challenge to its continuity and effectiveness, then reforming the authority of the Presidential Council is a test for the bloc’s forces, and means reforming themselves first.

The political forces within the National Bloc are distinguished in terms of representation in the Presidential Council’s authority system and in the state’s joints, but they are (overall), and through their performance, forces that obstruct the reform of the state and the consolidation of its presence in the liberated areas, because they contest the state’s functions and confiscate them in favor of its entities and apparatuses, not to mention their restriction of the government’s work and weakening it. Therefore, they are an integral part of the failure of the authority.

This applies to all parties and forces included in the bloc, although the "Congress" and "Islah" bear a greater responsibility. In addition to being the two largest parties in terms of representation in power, the military and security apparatuses affiliated with them not only contest the state's monopoly on power, but also undermine the possibility of establishing a unified authority. In addition, they (through their de facto authorities) hinder the unification of state institutions and apparatuses. Although they claim to strengthen the alignment of power, they undermine the manifestations of this alignment, and by fencing their influence, they establish their dominance over two parties, which hinders the possibility of reforming the Presidential Council into a consensual authority, not to mention restoring the state, not from the Houthi group, but in the liberated areas.

On the other hand, another problem appears that represents another challenge for the forces included in the bloc, not in terms of the difficulty of improving the economic situation due to its dependence on grants from the interveners, but in dismantling the synergy between a force calling for political and economic reform and the dysfunctions of its functional performance and corruption, since the corruption rooted in the joints of the state, in the government, and in the authority of the Presidential Council, arises from the corruption of these same forces that share power and manage it for their own benefit. Hence, they are involved in the looting of public funds and quick profit, and combating corruption requires firstly acknowledging their responsibility, and presenting their members involved in corruption cases to the Public Funds Prosecution, and also proposing a clear mechanism to address corruption in state facilities.

In the end, creating a political alignment, whatever its goals and slogans, clashes with the reality that these forces have produced. In the case of the National Bloc, the competition between the parties within the bloc and their representation of the agenda of their supporters has sacrificed the possibility of becoming the bearer of a comprehensive national project that represents the Yemenis and meets their demands, in exchange for their keenness to be represented in power and to establish a polarizing reality between them and their competitors and opponents. On the other hand, if the bloc of parties is keen to unify its battle against the Houthi group (politically, at least at the present time), it may push through this alignment to establish a counter-alignment.

Which leads to an escalation of the conflict in the liberated areas, by exporting itself as a legitimate political bloc, representing the federal state project, according to the references that it announced its agreement on, in contrast to the Southern Transitional Council, the active party in the southern arena, and the bloc’s partner in the authority of the Presidential Council, and with the bloc including the goal of resolving the southern issue, the Transitional Council (while adhering to its separatist agenda) may proceed with the arrangement of its Emirati ally in supporting its position as a force leading a southern bloc, which means, in light of the gamble of all the parties to the war in Yemen, the consecration of the climate of crisis and war.

*Quoted from Al-Araby Al-Jadeed