Yemenis between two traps

After the arrest of President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi in Sana’a at the end of January 2015, most of the Yemeni leaders fled Sana’a and the rest of the cities under the pretext of fearing for their lives from arrest or killing by the Houthi militias. Today, I wonder what if Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and the rest of the leaders had also decided to flee their country’s capital, which was and still is under bombardment, and preferred to start leading the battle against Russia from a neighboring capital.

Since the war began in his country, we have never seen Zelensky in an elegant suit, beautiful sunglasses, or an expensive watch, nor has he taken a team to photograph him from different angles to show off his handsomeness, nor do I think he is striving to obtain personal gains or travel allowances or impose moody appointments.

Of course, this hypothetical question has one answer: the Ukrainians will lose the war, regardless of the amount of foreign aid and support, because when citizens and soldiers lose sight of their leader, move away from their ranks, and do not feel that he is close to them, they will inevitably feel frustrated and broken.

This is exactly what did not happen in Yemen, even after the Houthi militants who overthrew the “state” on September 21, 2014, were expelled from Aden, which was chosen as the “temporary” capital, and it seems that it will remain in this state for a longer period than the optimists hope.

Talking and repeating the issues of “restoring the state” and “ending the coup” has become boring and a source of ridicule despite its utmost importance in the lives of Yemenis. It also brings back to the surface a topic I have often talked about, namely that the two issues are completely linked to the performance of the agencies and leaderships that claim to be working to accomplish the matter.

This is due to subjective and organic factors, and in both cases they are missing. This is the intractable knot that President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi has not been able to overcome for seven years, and it has not yet appeared, at least, that those who succeeded him are more capable of the positive action that is expected of them.

President Hadi was unable to break out of the very narrow circle from which he exercised rule, and his weak political imagination led to paralysis at the top of the pyramid of power. He did not immerse himself in the daily work of running a country in a period of fateful war that requires a vigilant and constant presence.

With his continued absence, actual power has moved to his home and office. Without oversight, follow-up, or accountability, whether from official agencies or the House of Representatives, this naturally leads to the spread of corruption and favoritism and the disruption of the implementation of all vital projects. Thus, the war has been prolonged and will continue in this recurring cycle.

The repeated rhetoric about the issues of “restoring the state” and “ending the coup” made the matter seem more like a joke than seriousness. Working to achieve these two goals will not be done through armed force, which is extremely important. But what is more decisive, as I will continue to repeat, is creating an attractive model for people to approach the ruling authority, support it, and look at it with respect, appreciation, and admiration. Was the “authority” able to create this climate? Of course not.

Here we ask ourselves, does the ruler coexist with the surrounding and accomplished climate or is he required to prepare and structure it in a way that aims at the two issues? It is inevitable that success begins with the leader and his surroundings becoming a model of financial integrity and administrative efficiency and moving away from the infatuation with the spotlight and seeing his pictures hanging on the walls and in the streets, and being satisfied with them with the assumption that they will create a position for him that he must realize that he can only reach through hard and diligent work that people touch and see the results of in their lives.

If we go to Sana'a, everything I hear about what is happening there is regret, sorrow and anger to the point of oppression. The authorities there are busy strengthening their capabilities by controlling all economic tools and financial resources and strengthening their security wings by silencing every different voice, even if it is not an opposition. Their first mission is to create a model that is as far away as possible from the work of institutions subject to oversight and accountability, and is closer to the Big Brother model, as described by George Orwell in his famous novel 1984.

The "authority" in Sana'a continues its favorite hobby through its campaigns to suppress and close all independent platforms after presenting a list of confessions and accusations that no one knows the extent of their veracity, let alone their legality, but what is certain is that they are part of steps to control and dominate all the resources and projects of non-governmental and even international organizations and to arrest employees to terrorize everyone who works in the humanitarian and volunteer field and anyone who practices any political activity.

Yemenis fall into the trap of choosing between two authorities that do not offer an honest model that can be resorted to or considered as preferable. In Aden, there is a model of an “authority” that has all the external support and the people’s desire for good governance, but it does not make any effort (other than pictures and statements) to excuse its sins. And another in Sana’a does not care about people’s opinions and does not give them weight in its calculations, as it is the one that thinks, decides, and implements, leaving them their only right to be heard and obeyed.

*Quoted from Independent Arabia