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Munir Shafiq
Netanyahu will destroy himself with his own hands
Opinions| 1 December, 2024 - 7:43 PM
When Resolution 1701 was issued to declare a ceasefire in the 2006 war, it did not express the extent of the field victory that Hezbollah had achieved militarily on the ground. This was despite the Zionist entity being forced to strive to stop the war, especially after the tank graveyard in Wadi al-Hujayr.
Of course, the first person responsible for Resolution 1701 not reflecting the military balance of power on the ground, especially with the deterioration of the Zionist army and the political leadership to stop the war, was America and the Lebanese political equation, which in turn did not notice or reflect the reality of the military balance of power. The Prime Minister’s Office, at the time, was against the resistance.
Restrictions were placed on some of the resolution’s provisions, and Hezbollah had to overcome them, practically, when trying to implement the resolution, and then establish the situation in which the resolution was implemented, in reality, to reflect the reality of the balance of power, more than what the resolution reflected in some of its provisions.
Recalling this example may be useful in dealing with, and even reading, some of the provisions of the current agreement that was approved on the morning of November 27 of this year 2024, as it included some provisions that do not reflect the general balance of power, nor the balance of power on the ground in some respects, and expressed the American-French role biased towards the Zionist entity, on the other hand. In addition to the “American guarantee paper for implementing the decision” (outside the agreement), in order to save face for Netanyahu, who failed to achieve the goals he announced in launching the military aggression against Hezbollah and Lebanon.
He also expressed what the Americans, in particular, are planning for the axis of resistance in the coming period after this date, and specifically the period of Trump, who stressed, from behind the scenes, the need to reach an agreement to stop the war in Lebanon.
Hence, reading the texts of the agreement, and the American-Zionist “understanding” issued alongside it (the guarantees paper) in the face of the post-agreement phase, the evaluation of the agreement should not be based on them alone; because what preceded this agreement should be read as a major setback for the goals that Netanyahu set for the war on Hezbollah.
This explains much of the criticism directed at Netanyahu by Zionists because of this agreement, which embodied Netanyahu’s failure to achieve the goal he set for the war of aggression, and the consequences that will result from it on both levels, with regard to the non-return of those who abandoned their settlements in northern Palestine, and the failure to secure them from any future danger to them.
The agreement was signed, the ceasefire was implemented, and the displaced Lebanese began to return to their homes. They raised the victory sign from the windows of their cars. The agreement was rightly read as a defeat for the aggression, and a failure for Netanyahu, far from the text of the agreement, and what the American pledges to Netanyahu contained in the event that the agreement was implemented.
Thus, the future of the agreement was decided from the first moment, as it expressed the defeat of the aggression and the cessation of fire, while Hezbollah remained the primary controller of the practical implementation, exactly as happened with Resolution 1701 after the 2006 war.
Of course, this is natural and logical, in light of the generally given balance of power, as in the Lebanese territory, and it is the general direction that events will take. And what the fate of the current and future situation in Lebanon will lead to, as well as the conflict in the region, starting from the post-agreement stage. Which adds another justification for approving the agreement.
Here, before continuing to assess the situation for the year 2025, we must carefully monitor what strategy and policies Donald Trump will propose at the global level (the conflict with China), or at the regional level, especially the conflict with Iran.
The Zionist entity's possession of the right to intervene in this way, which reveals the nature of the American-Zionist understanding under the table, makes the agreement a pretext to explode on its base even before Trump's arrival.
Thus, the agreement that was designed during Biden’s term is intended to escalate, worsen, and continue the war. Therefore, the agreement must be reconsidered even from where it came from; because Netanyahu and Biden want it to be an agreement that constitutes a continuation of the aggression.
On the other hand, Netanyahu has destroyed, with his own hands, his goal of creating a separation between the two resistances in Gaza and Lebanon.
Note that such a thing would not have happened, due to its principled and strategic nature, even if the ceasefire agreement had been successful, as was expected.
Thus, on the other hand, official Lebanon (the government and parliament) and the resistance have made their support for the agreement the responsibility for the war waged on Lebanon, a responsibility solely on the necks of Biden and Netanyahu (America and the Zionist entity) for waging the war. This is when they threaten the agreement with such bombing that leads to the return of fire, otherwise what is the meaning of having the right to bomb whenever they want, or first, any position or event.
In a word, the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon stands at a crossroads: either maintain it, or, as Netanyahu wants, return to war.
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