End of the Presidential Leadership Council mission

$730 million was illegally seized by senior government officials in the electricity and fuel sectors, according to a single report by the Central Organization for Control and Accounting, in a very short time, not exceeding years, on the fingers of one hand. These crimes recently emerged after a dispute between these corrupt individuals, headed by the Leadership Council.

Last year, the parliamentary committee report also mentioned corruption worth billions of dollars in a few sectors, including fuel, communications and electricity.

The above two reports were issued by influential parties in the government, meaning that these scandals are what the influential parties in the government, through its leadership council and the cabinet, agreed to show and expose, and do not include the agreed-upon corruption. For example, neither the Presidential Leadership Council nor its government, i.e. the government of Ben Mubarak, presented a final statement for the past year nor a general budget for the new year, and both parties agreed that there was no need for that. These corruption reports appeared after personal battles erupted between Mubarak and the leadership council. The parliamentary committee report appeared after a personal battle between former Prime Minister Moeen Abdulmalik and businessman Ahmed Al-Eissa, who also held the position of Deputy Director of the Presidential Office for Economic Affairs at the time.

This means that the emergence of these astronomical figures of massive corruption and organized and unorganized crime did not come as a result of an anti-corruption strategy, but rather as a result of a conflict between government leaders and senior officials over sharing these enormous wealth. In any case, this is a good thing, better than continuing their agreement on corruption and corruption.

Let's admit it: The impact of the Syrian revolution should be clear; first, resolving the internal conflict between the revolutionary people and the corrupt government. The recently accomplished Syrian revolution says one thing: building strength against Iran requires overthrowing the Presidential Council.

In practice, the Presidential Council is mostly made up of warlords who have transformed from heroes in the past into warlords who benefit the Yemeni people and share all their money and revenues in a criminal manner. They have also included other weak, trivial, opportunistic figures with no social or political weight, with the mentality of opportunistic employees, such as Rashad Al-Alimi.

The strange and discordant combination of the council has opened additional wide doors to corruption in addition to what has existed since the rule of the infamous Hadi, and what he inherited from the Saleh regime.

When the Leadership Council was appointed or formed, the presidential declaration of the ousted Hadi stated that the goal of the Leadership Council was to lead a negotiated peace process with the Houthis.

The formation of the council was primarily a Saudi regional response that also had local factors, due to the regional reality that Tehran had at the time the greatest influence, at least in Yemen. With the collapse of the Iranian axis and the victory of the Arab revolution in Syria, there was no longer any reason for the leadership council to remain.

The regional factors that have recently emerged indicate that the need for the Leadership Council has ended. Iran is neither the victorious regional power in the internal Arab wars, nor is its threat imminent to the Gulf, nor are its arms the strongest organizations in the region.

This is combined with massive corruption, blatant incompetence and unprecedented criminality in which Yemeni state institutions are drowning at all levels, including the Leadership Council. The latter’s attempt to appear as if it is fighting corruption is futile and criminal. The Leadership Council does not operate according to the constitution, and its formation is also unconstitutional despite an attempt to give it a legal character with the approval of the House of Representatives. However, the House of Representatives itself has not met for ten years. Neither the Leadership Council, nor the House of Representatives, nor the Council of Ministers, nor the local authorities, nor the Central Organization for Control and Accounting, nor state companies, nor any of its huge revenue-generating institutions have data on their revenues.

The responsibility for isolating this council lies with the people themselves. Disabling state institutions through legitimate legal means, including a general strike, demonstrations, and resorting to the judiciary, are important and possible options, and starting to implement them will be decisive for the Yemenis’ battle against corruption, hunger, and poverty, and a fundamental point without which victory in the face of the Houthis is impossible.