Hadhramaut and demands for self-rule: 3 scenarios for competition over power and resources

An American research center reviewed the conflict in Hadhramaut, eastern Yemen, and the demands of tribal components and alliances for "self-rule" after months of protests that began with service and political demands led by the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance and the Hadhramaut Comprehensive Conference.

The American research and analysis center "SARI Global" provided an in-depth analysis of regional transformations, economic pressures, and operational risks, and identified three possible scenarios and their implications for stability, humanitarian access, and foreign engagement.

The American report - translated by "Yemeni Youth Net" - saw that Hadhramaut stands at a crossroads, with increasing demands for tribal autonomy, disputes over oil revenues, and increasing security risks that shape its future.

The Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance is exploiting the oil blockade and regional control to push for more autonomy, according to the US report, which said, “Failure to reach an agreement to share revenues could lead to further tribal blockades, disruption of exports, and deepening of the economic crisis in Yemen.”

The American research center, concerned with crisis management and security, pointed out that "competing factions, changing alliances, and military checkpoints create a volatile security environment, threatening humanitarian and commercial access."

His in-depth report provides essential reading for policymakers and organizations working in Yemen, he warned, “Hadhramaut faces a path towards either negotiated stability, open conflict over resources, or prolonged stagnation that fosters smuggling and ungoverned spaces.”

"Yemeni Youth Net" publishes the text of the translation of the American Research Center's report as follows..

Introduction to Hadhramaut

Hadhramaut is Yemen’s largest and most strategic governorate, thanks to its vast oil reserves, long coastline along the Arabian Sea, and influential tribal networks. Since 2015, the region’s political and security landscape has evolved under the pressures of the war in Yemen and competing regional interventions by Saudi Arabia and other regional actors.

The Masila Basin in Hadhramaut used to produce more than 100,000 barrels per day, and currently production ranges between 70 and 80,000 barrels per day, reflecting the turbulent security environment.

Over the past few months, a combination of tribal mobilization, strategic blockades, government troop movements, and the deployment of rival groups has created an increasingly fragmented environment.

The Hadramaut Tribal Alliance has played a pivotal role in shaping current events. Initially founded to defend local resources and address historical grievances over marginalization, it has since evolved into a broad federation capable of halting shipments, negotiating with national authorities, and cultivating alliances with powerful actors inside and outside Yemen.

The continued influence of this alliance over the roads and oil export corridors has thrust Hadramawt into the center of complex negotiations, which often involve the government’s Presidential Council of Leadership and other local paramilitary forces contesting tribal control.

Security Overview

Rival groups that have entrenched themselves along the coast have repeatedly clashed with local tribes loyal to the Hadramawt tribal alliance. In early January, a series of missile strikes and shelling incidents west of Mukalla escalated tensions significantly.

It targeted the sites of the Hadhramaut Alliance tribes west of Mukalla and near "Rujima - Mayfa", which were subjected to shelling and rocket fire attributed to competing local factions. Although the details are still unclear, local observers attributed the attacks to forces seeking to weaken tribal influence near strategic coastal roads.

Tribal fighters responded by reinforcing checkpoints, deploying additional personnel, and threatening broader economic retaliation if the government did not address their demands. During January, the Presidential Council deployed new forces to Hadramawt under the command of senior officers in order to maintain government authority and avoid a complete tribal blockade.

Local media reports indicate that on January 6, these forces established advanced positions in areas historically controlled by tribes allied with the Hadramaut Tribal Alliance.

This increased presence has raised concerns among tribal leaders, who interpret the move as a prelude to a possible crackdown. As a result, the Hadramawt tribal coalition has stepped up its use of road closures, halting the flow of essential goods to Aden and, at times, restricting vital fuel shipments.

Amid rising local tensions, additional security contractors have reportedly arrived in Sector 14 in the Msila Basin. Although details are scarce, local sources indicate that these contractors will work to bolster perimeter defense and support infrastructure management rather than engage in any local armed action.

Their arrival underscores the high value that outside actors and industries place on Hadramaut’s oil fields, especially against the backdrop of a threatening tribal blockade and shifting security loyalties.

Political and tribal dynamics

Hadrami tribes have long demanded a fair sharing of revenues from oil produced in their territory, and these demands are rooted in a history of perceived neglect by central authorities, which many Hadramis believe has prioritized profit-making by the country’s central authority, at the expense of investment in local development.

The Hadramaut Tribal Alliance's influence relies on a mix of tribal legitimacy and cautious alliances with other power centers, and although it sometimes cooperates with government figures, it insists on self-rule.

The Hadhrami coalition is marshalling such sentiments in its negotiations with the government, and by mid-January, the coalition had temporarily halted several fuel convoys heading south, a move timed to coincide with public frustration over power cuts and the depreciating currency in Aden and surrounding areas.

The Hadramaut Tribal Alliance’s influence in the city rests on a mix of tribal legitimacy and cautious alliances with other power centers. Although the alliance has sometimes cooperated with government figures, it insists on protecting Hadramaut’s independence. As rival coastal groups have begun to expand their influence inland, tensions have risen, and the tribes interpret any encroachment on their territory as a direct threat to their economic lifeblood—control of roads, infrastructure, and oil shipments.

A particularly significant move came in late February, when a Hadramawt tribal coalition announced a ban on the supply of crude oil to Aden’s main electricity grid. This was widely seen as a move that would exacerbate Aden’s energy crisis, increasing the risks for the government and local power brokers.

Armed groups and tribal alliances

The current security environment in Hadramawt is shaped by a wide range of armed factions. An analysis of the network of interactions between the stakeholders —supplemented by an accompanying map of territorial control— shows a patchwork of ever-changing alliances. The Hadramawt tribal coalition often coordinates with local tribes, particularly along oil transport routes, to maintain leverage in negotiations with the central government.

Rival groups, some of which receive support from external sponsors, wield significant influence in coastal areas, impose their own checkpoints and strike deals with local tribal elements seeking financial or security guarantees.

Within Wadi Hadramaut, pro-government forces under the leadership of the Presidential Council claim a nominal presence. Some tribes in the area maintain working relations with these forces, provided they respect local autonomy and avoid heavy-handed tactics. However, friction arises when government units expand, set up roadblocks or push for control of strategic junctions.

Similarly, paramilitary units based in and around Mukalla move through delicate understandings with quasi-tribal alliances that trade local intelligence or temporary access rights in exchange for a share of tax revenues or other concessions.

This interwoven web of tribal groups, government-aligned units, and externally sponsored militias contributes to the fragmentation that characterizes today’s security landscape. Loyalties can be fragile, fluctuating quickly if new financial promises, resource deals, or political developments emerge.

If production and export of Hadhramaut oil continues in full, annual income could exceed $1 billion.

These dynamics create significant operational hurdles for humanitarian agencies, commercial shipping companies, and even government entities seeking to move across different areas of influence.

Economic factors and pressures of the oil sector

Hadramaut’s oil production is centered around the Masila Basin, which once produced more than 100,000 barrels per day. Current production is between 70,000 and 80,000 barrels per day, reflecting the fragile security environment and intermittent unrest. Revenue estimates vary, but if production and exports continue at full capacity, annual income from Hadramaut oil could easily exceed $1 billion.

Such figures underscore why many of the desert-based tribal factions view the paramilitary militias along the coast as crucial to their political and financial goals, and road closures imposed by tribal forces have sometimes brought transport to a standstill.

Food, medical aid and commercial goods face delays, creating local shortages that extend to all markets in southern Yemen. Commercial transport companies and aid organizations are proliferating. Both companies and aid organizations must negotiate safe passage through checkpoints, a process complicated by overlapping jurisdictions, informal fees and shifting alliances.

Pushing Hadhramaut towards self-rule

A hallmark of Hadramaut’s political landscape is the enduring aspiration for self-rule. Deep historical grievances against the central administrations in Sana’a and Aden have convinced many Hadramis that local governance—backed by direct access to oil revenues—would better serve the governorate’s development needs.

Oman’s focus on stabilizing its own borders—while maintaining a neutral stance in the Yemen conflict—may encourage conditions favorable to local autonomy in Hadramawt.

The Hadramaut Tribal Alliance has championed these demands, insisting that no solution can be sustainable unless Hadramaut retains real control over its resources. External actors are also shaping the self-rule debate.

In addition to the well-known involvement of Saudi Arabia, Oman exercises a more subtle influence on tribal politics, and cross-border tribal ties link parts of eastern Hadhramaut to lands near the Omani border, where families move back and forth for trade, employment, and social relations.

Observers point out that Oman's focus on stabilizing its own borders - while maintaining a neutral stance in the Yemen conflict - may encourage conditions favorable to local self-rule in Hadramawt.

Tribal sheikhs with cross-border connections sometimes seek Omani mediation or financial support, hoping to bolster Hadhramaut's ability to govern independently without overtly antagonizing major regional powers.

This interaction highlights the weaknesses and strengths of Hadramawt’s self-rule efforts. On the other hand, multiple foreign interests complicate the region’s internal politics, and any push for self-rule risks angering factions worried about losing oil income.

Potential risks of division

As different factions consolidate territorial control or form short-term alliances, the risk of losing access to key roads, ports, or oil facilities remains high, and the fragmentation of Hadramaut’s security environment could lead to unpredictable closures and armed confrontations that disrupt normal trade and humanitarian relief efforts. A single tribal dispute or rivalry between local leaders could spark a blockade that could halt the movement of essential resources.

For external stakeholders – such as NGOs, commercial operators and diplomatic missions – this volatility necessitates robust contingency planning. Risk mitigation measures include:

• Continuously monitor tribal alliances and leadership structures, updating them daily or weekly.
• Safe route agreements negotiated with local leaders who control key points of interest, ensuring unhindered passage for relief convoys.
• Decentralized storage so that temporary blockades do not cut off all supplies to vulnerable populations.
• Dedicated security connectivity built into local networks for real-time conflict updates.

Organizations that currently lack in-depth intelligence on shifting alliances risk sudden and potentially dangerous encounters at checkpoints manned by unfamiliar or hostile factions. Similarly, rapid changes in the position of a single local sheikh can reverberate throughout the region, closing previously open routes.

Human and social dimensions

Protest movements in Mukalla and Seiyun have drawn attention to widespread social and economic distress. Protesters are denouncing unemployment, deteriorating public services, and an inflated currency. Several local journalists who have reported on the protests have been arrested or threatened, pointing to a crackdown on dissent that crosses factional lines.

Economic hardship, exacerbated by the blockade strategy, has made it difficult for low-income families to secure stable energy, clean water and basic health care.

In rural areas outside major cities, tribes often run their own security arrangements, settling local disputes through customary mechanisms. While these decentralized structures can fill governance gaps, they also leave room for illicit activities, such as fuel smuggling and arms trafficking.

Extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, despite being largely driven out of Mukalla in 2016, continue to exploit the desert corridors and the general lack of a unified police force. They are reportedly still able to carry out hit-and-run attacks, kidnappings, and propaganda efforts to recruit disillusioned youth.

3 possible scenarios

• Scenario 1: Negotiated revenue sharing agreement and partial stability

1. The Presidential Leadership Council and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance reach an agreement that ensures the fair distribution of oil revenues.
2. In return, the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance lifts its ban on supplying electricity to Aden.
3. Full road access for essential goods is resumed, armed checkpoints are reduced and the push for self-rule is halted.

Starting points:

- Official Dialogue Initiative: Announcing an organized negotiation process between the Presidential Council and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, which may include neutral mediators or local mediation forums.
- External pressures or incentives: tangible offers from regional powers, for example, pledges of development aid, infrastructure projects, and security guarantees that persuade both sides to give up revenue shares.
- Easing coastal tensions: Rival groups in coastal areas are committed to refraining from further inland expansion, alleviating tribal fears of annexation.

Early warning indicators:

- Public statements of rapprochement: Tribal coalition spokesmen and Presidential Council officials use the language of cooperation in media interviews.
- Partial reopening of roads: Gradual easing of checkpoint controls, with reports of fuel and essential goods moving freely into southern cities.
- Oil sector stability: News of stable production levels from the Masila Basin and a decline in disturbances at export terminals.

Possible outcomes:

- Humanitarian conditions improve as goods flow more reliably through Hadramaut.
- Strengthening local confidence in the Presidential Council if it demonstrates fairness in allocating resources.
- Forming potential short-term alliances between tribes and government-allied forces to maintain new agreements.

• Scenario Two: Escalation and Deepening of the Conflict

1. Rival factions, encouraged by outside support to secure strategic routes and oil infrastructure, are pushing deeper into the interior.
2. The tribal coalition responds by intensifying its siege, expanding its checkpoints, and possibly cutting off fuel or vital energy to the southern regions.
3. This escalation disrupts oil production, exacerbates local grievances, threatens to spark violent clashes and fuels further calls for self-rule.

Starting points:

- The rival group's advance: any increase in armed forces outside its current strongholds, especially towards the Hadramaut Valley or major oil installations.
- Collapse of existing negotiations: Failure or sudden halt in any ongoing talks between the Presidential Council and the Hadhramaut Tribal Alliance, leading to a “no more dialogue” position from either side.
- Security incidents involving tribal leaders: Assassination or kidnapping of a prominent leader of the Hadhramaut tribal alliance, leading to calls for revenge and collective tribal mobilization.

Early warning indicators:

- Increased military build-up: Reports of reinforcement convoys heading towards Sayun, Mukalla or major highway intersections.
- Sharp increase in road closures: New roadblocks or checkpoints appear on previously open roads, accompanied by threats to commercial or humanitarian convoys.
- Public rhetoric of revenge: Local radio broadcasts or social media posts from tribal factions calling for the “defense of Hadramawt” or urging the complete expulsion of foreign militias.

Possible outcomes:

- A significant decline in oil production and rising fuel prices, which will intensify the economic slowdown in Yemen.
- Increased risk of civilian displacement, especially near roads and contested oil fields.
- Greater opportunities for smugglers and extremist groups to exploit the chaos.

• Scenario 3: Prolonged stagnation and fragmentation

1. The Presidential Council has failed to broker a lasting settlement with the Hadramawt tribal coalition, and no faction has achieved decisive control.
2. Multiple checkpoints, partial roadblocks, and sporadic clashes become the “new normal.”
3. Smuggling networks thrive in the security vacuum, while extremist cells find safe havens in remote desert areas.

Starting points:

- Stalled negotiations without an exit strategy: repeated inconclusive meetings between the Presidential Council, tribes and local actors without a mechanism to move the talks forward.
- Entrenched interests: local militias that set up semi-permanent checkpoints, collect fees, and are financially invested in the status quo.
- International distractions: Decreased diplomatic engagement if external actors shift their focus to other crises, leaving Hadhramaut’s fragmentation unchecked.

Early warning indicators:

- Steady rise in smuggling arrests or incidents: The proliferation of smuggling routes, indicating a decline in the regulatory authority of any single authority.
- Local ceasefires without central coordination: Tribes and smaller militia leaders hold short-term, temporary truces to achieve mutual gains, none of which address core governance or revenue issues.
- Prolonged fuel and commodity shortages: Continuing reports of shortages in local markets, with no signs of improvement.

Possible outcomes:

- Ongoing insecurity that impedes humanitarian operations and commercial activities.
- Fragmented authorities in Hadhramaut, each imposing its own rules and taxes, perpetuating economic hardship.
- Greater difficulty for any future negotiators in unifying the region, as local powerbrokers become accustomed to a fragmented system of control.