After the failure of the Aspides mission, a research center: How can the European Union better deal with Houthi naval attacks?

Since the outbreak of the war on Gaza, Yemen’s maritime borders have become an arena for a struggle for influence between regional and international powers. The Houthi group has deliberately obstructed shipping through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, which is the entrance to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, with the aim of pressuring the economies of Israel and Western countries, according to the group, to accelerate the ceasefire in Gaza.

The United States and European countries have tried to address this dilemma by forming naval task forces to protect shipping, but these efforts have often been unsuccessful. The best example of these efforts is Operation Aspides , launched by the European Union Naval Force.

Like Operation Prosperity Sentinel, a multinational naval coalition led by the United States, Aspides’ mission approach is short-term focused and lacks a comprehensive strategy to eliminate, or at least significantly reduce, the Houthi threat to maritime traffic.

So, Europeans need to adopt a different approach that balances their desire to defend commercial shipping in the Red Sea with the need to create the conditions necessary for establishing a lasting peace in Yemen that ensures that the Houthis do not again disrupt shipping traffic through Bab al-Mandab.

Operation Aspides: A Model of Self-Control

The Aspides mission, based in Greece, was launched on 19 February 2024, in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2722. The operation is scheduled to last for one year and aims to achieve three main objectives: protecting commercial vessels from Houthi attacks; ensuring their safe passage through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; and enhancing maritime security awareness.

As of late September 2024, the Aspides mission had escorted more than 250 commercial vessels in the Red Sea, repelling at least eleven Houthi attacks on at least four occasions using anti-ship ballistic missiles.

Operation Aspides remained separate from the US and UK strikes on Houthi weapons storage facilities and missile launchers, which had become a distinctly military campaign. “Operation Aspides seeks to reduce the risk, not neutralize it,” a senior Yemeni government official noted.1

But when you consider that nearly 22,000 ships passed through the strait last year, the 250 ships that made it through seem like a small number. Data suggests that traffic through the Bab el-Mandeb strait has fallen by at least 55 percent compared to 2023, disrupting supply chains through the strait, worth $1 trillion annually.

Major shipping companies have therefore rerouted their ships to the Cape of Good Hope. Ships passing through the strait also face multidimensional threats that Operation Aspides and Operation Prosperity Guardian have sought to address. Last August, for example, Aspides helped prevent an environmental disaster by providing relief to the Greek ship MV Sounion, which was carrying 150 tons of crude oil and rescuing 27 sailors on board, after it was attacked by the Houthis.

The EU launched Operation Aspides two months after Spain, France and Italy refused to place their ships under US command as part of Operation Prosperity Sentinel. The reasons for this withdrawal were reportedly concerns over command and control, a desire to avoid offensive operations, and Washington’s support for Israel.

The launch and scope of the Aspides mission were intended to create a European naval force independent of the US-led coalition, to enhance the EU’s strategic autonomy and cohesion, given its heavy reliance on the US for its defence policy; and to avoid getting involved in an asymmetric confrontation with the Houthis.

The EU also wanted to build trust with regional partners, demonstrate its commitment to defending freedom of navigation and the rules-based international order by working to establish maritime security in the region, and defend its interests by protecting shipping operations.

In April 2024, a statement by EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell highlighted a key difference between the European and US approaches to maritime security, stressing that the Aspides mission “is not engaged in any ground operations against the Houthis” and that “[its ships] are acting in self-defense.” Unlike the Sentinel mission, for example, Aspides does not conduct preemptive airstrikes against Houthi military positions and targets.

By creating ASPEDES within a month, the EU Council agreed to launch a naval operation with a specific, temporary mission and a limited, defensive mandate, allowing European countries to reach a minimum agreement among themselves on the decision-making mechanism.

Although the frequency of Houthi attacks on commercial ships escalated during the war in Gaza, they actually began in 2016, during the first years of the war waged by the Saudi-led coalition against the Houthis.

This suggests that new maritime crises around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait could emerge if the Houthis continue to control northwestern Yemen amidst a backdrop of regional chaos, conflict, and turmoil. When the Houthis resumed their attacks on shipping last year, most expected them to end in a few weeks, but they continue to this day.

The EU and the international community in general have chosen to separate this crisis from the conditions necessary for lasting peace in Yemen, keeping Red Sea trade hostage to the political calculations of the Houthis, who operate on behalf of Iran.

The Council of the European Union stressed “the importance of Yemen for the main sea supply lines used to deliver energy products and other goods; the goal of ensuring security and stability in the Gulf, Red Sea and Horn of Africa; as well as the need to prevent the further spread of terrorist organisations.”

In light of this, Europeans must muster the political will to adopt long-term policies that would ensure security and stability in Yemen. Instead, they have focused on ill-designed de-escalation processes that have rewarded and emboldened the Houthis, without achieving lasting peace. This approach has clearly run into difficulties.

Neither Aspides nor Prosperity Sentinel have been able to secure freedom of navigation through the Bab el-Mandeb, and are unlikely to do so. If the EU wants to take more effective action, its member states must develop a common strategy for Yemen to have a better chance of success. This may require two parallel tracks.

First , the EU should reconsider its support for peace processes in Yemen. These provide incentives to the Houthis without making concessions, but they do not contribute to prioritizing talks on the security situation and the uncontrolled proliferation of conventional and non-conventional weapons, especially those possessed by the Houthis and smuggled by Iran into Yemen. These talks are essential to address long-term challenges and reduce the risk of a collapse of peace prospects.

For example, prior to the events of October 7, 2023, work was underway to reach a roadmap for de-escalation in Yemen under the auspices of the United Nations and mediated by the Sultanate of Oman and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

The roadmap was poised to offer political concessions and economic gains to the Houthis, including contributing to the salaries of civil servants and fighters in Houthi-controlled areas; suspending the UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen, thereby allowing goods, including weapons, to enter Hodeidah without oversight, despite the Houthis’ poor record on human rights, political partnership, and governance.

The implicit message was that the international community could turn a blind eye to the Houthis’ destabilizing actions as long as they remained confined to Yemen’s borders and targeted only neighboring Arab countries.

The United States later withdrew from the UN plan after Houthi attacks on commercial shipping and re-listed the Houthis as a global terrorist organization. However, launching an internationally backed military operation to retake Hodeidah and resolve the gaps in the Stockholm Agreement is not currently on the table.

During the armed conflict in Yemen over the past decade, following the failure of the country’s peaceful transition in 2014, the EU has focused on dialogue and conflict resolution efforts in coordination with the Office of the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary-General for Yemen. It has also provided technical support to the internationally recognized Yemeni government opposed to the Houthis. These efforts have been accompanied by expanded contacts with the Houthis.

But the fact that this relatively soft approach did not change the behavior of the Houthis after the outbreak of the war on Gaza highlights, from a Western perspective, that the quick and temporary solutions and policies of appeasement followed since the signing of the Stockholm Agreement have only emboldened the Houthis, the opposite of what was intended. This situation opens the door for the European Union to reassess its policy towards Yemen and determine whether the Houthis pose a threat to international peace, trade and security.

In light of the recent escalation near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, it is unlikely that the Yemeni peace process will make significant progress anytime soon. If the EU truly wants Yemen to enjoy stability and security and to meet its legal and moral obligations to protect its coastline, it will be necessary to rethink how to secure the Red Sea, reach a lasting peace agreement, and urge the Houthis to enter into negotiations in good faith.

secondly

This situation also indicates that the causes of the Yemeni conflict still exist today, along with a state of misunderstanding or underestimation of the Houthi ideology and its Iranian-backed project, which have turned the Yemeni maritime borders into an international battlefield, which may lead to the establishment of a long-term military presence in the region.

The record of Operation Aspides, which seeks to deter threats to shipping in the Red Sea and avoid undermining the fragile but currently faltering de-escalation process in Yemen, is an implicit admission of Western miscalculation preceded by years of mostly fruitless policies of appeasement and containment.

The lack of Western political will to align with the security priorities of the Gulf states when the Arab coalition was formed against the Houthis a decade ago has complicated joint efforts to contain the crisis today. This, coupled with the absence of a long-term strategy, has exacerbated the threats weighing heavily on the situation in the Red Sea.

Going forward, any behind-the-scenes talks between the United States, Iran, and the Houthis to halt their attacks in the Red Sea will continue to clash with Tehran’s terms of regional de-escalation—whether they relate to Iran itself, Gaza, Lebanon, or some combination of these areas—which will further bolster the Houthis’ reputation.

But that will not prevent the recurrence of this crisis in the Red Sea, as maritime trade through its waters will remain hostage to the Houthis and Iran as a negotiating card that they can use to extract more concessions on other issues.

Source: Carnegie Middle East Center